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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-379
NASA FMEA #: 330-FM16
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
379
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO NON-REDUNDANCY OF SCU, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA
CRITICALITY AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE REMAINING ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-501
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-731X
NASA FMEA #: 330-FM17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
731
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-502
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-732X
330-FM18
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
EMU
732
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-503
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-372 BASELINE [ ]
330-FM19 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
372
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-504
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/i0/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-369
NASA FMEA #: 330-FM2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
369
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT BUT THE IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING 330-FMI AND FM2 TO REFLEXT THE ENTIRE MISSION SCENARIO.
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-505
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-373
NASA FMEA #: 330-FM20
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
373
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-506
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-371
NASA FMEA #: 330-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
371
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH
THE REMAINDER OF THE ANALYSIS. HOWEVER, THE IOA DOES RECOMMEND
COMBINING NASA FAILURE MODES 330-FM3 AND -FM4 TO REFLECT THE
MISSION SCENARIO.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-507
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-371A
NASA FMEA #: 330-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
371
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING NASA FAILURE MODES 330-FM3 AND -FM4
TO REFLECT THE COMPLETE MISSION SCENARIO. THEREFORE, A 2/IRB
CRITICALITY SHOULD BE ASSIGNED.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-508
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
EMU-370 BASELINE [ ]
330-FM5 NEW [ X ]
EMU
370
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR SCREEN A WHICH
THE IOARECOMMENDS PASSING DUE TO "CAPABILITY" FOR TEST.
ADDITIONALLY THE IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING 330-FM5 AND -FM6 TO
REFLECT THE ENTIRE MISSION SCENARIO.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-509
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-370A
NASA FMEA #: 330-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
370
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY TO REFLECT THE ENTIRE
MISSION SCENARIO WHICH WOULD ALSO SUGGEST COMBINING FAILURE MODES
330-FM5 AND -FM6.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-510
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-381
NASA FMEA #: 330-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
381
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-511
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-380
NASA FMEA #: 330-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
380
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-512
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-374
NASA FMEA #: 330-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
374
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. CAUSES SHOULD BE EXPANDED
TO INCLUDE VIBRATION.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-513
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-484
NASA FMEA #: 350-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
484
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-514
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-766X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
766
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-515
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-767X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FMII
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
767
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-516
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-768X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM12
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
EMU
768
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-517
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-769X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
769
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A NEW CRITICALITY TO REFLECT THE FOLLOWING
SCENARIO. WHEN THE DISCRETE FAILS ON THE CWS DOES NOT MONITOR
FOR "HIGH OXYGEN USE RATE" AND "H20 OFF STATUS". THIS CAN
POSSIBLY COMBINE WITH AN OXYGEN LEAK AND REQUIRE EMERGENCY USE OF
THE
SOP. SOP FAILURE CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-518
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-472
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 472
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-519
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-471
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 471
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-520
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-469
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM16
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 469
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-521
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-470
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 470
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-522
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-498
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM18
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 498
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-523
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-499
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM19
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 499
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-524
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-492
350-FM20
EMU
492
DCM ELECTRONICS
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT; HOWEVER, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS CHANGING THE FAILURE MODE FROM DRIFTS LOW TO FAILS OFF
DUE TO AN ELECTRICAL OPEN.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-525
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-493
350-FM21
EMU
493
DCM ELECTRONICS
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] C ]
[P] [P]
[N] CN]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-526
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-490
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 490
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[p] [F] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-527
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-494
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 494
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] IF] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-528
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-495
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 495
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] [F] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-529
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-497
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 497
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] C F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-530
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-481
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM23
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
481
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-531
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-770X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM24
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
770
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] IF] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOAAND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE FAILED FUNCTION IS
NOT DETECTABLE NOR IS IT AUTOMATICALLY BACKED UP.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-532
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-771X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM25
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
771
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-533
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-772X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM26
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
772
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS NOT
DETECTABLE NOR IS THE FAILED FUNCTION AUTOMATICALLY BACKED UP.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-534
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-773X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM27
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
773
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-535
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
EMU-774X
350-FM28
EMU
774
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] C ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-536
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-775X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM29
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
775
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS A FAILURE MODE OF THE SYSTEM BUT
RATHER AN ANOMALY. AS SUCH, THE IOA RECOMMENDS ITS DELETION FROM
THE NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-537
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-475
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
475
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-538
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-477
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
477
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-539
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-489
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 489
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-540
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-776X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM30
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
776
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA DOES NOT CONSIDER THE IDENTIFIED NASA "FAILURE MODE" AS
CREDIBLE. THE IOA CONSIDERS IT APPLICABLE TO A HAZARD ANALYSIS
BUT NOT AN FMEA. THE IOA RECOMMENDS ITS DELETION FROM THE NASA
FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-541
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-482
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM31
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
482
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCEEN B WHICH THE
IOA NOW AGREES WITH.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-542
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-777X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM32
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
777
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[ NA]
[F]
[N]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF THE B SCREEN BECAUSE IT IS NOT DETECTABLE
NOR IS THE FAILED FUNCTION AUTOMATICALLY BACKED UP.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-543
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-491
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM33
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 491
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-544
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-778X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM34
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
778
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/IR] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR TO REFLECT A TWO FAILURE SCENARIO WHERE
THE IDENTIFIED FAILURE OCCURS THEREBY CAUSING LOSS OF THE "LOW
VOLTAGE ELECTRONICS" WHICH INCLUDES C02 SENSING. IF A SECOND
FAILURE (HIGH C02_ WERE TO THEN OCCUR, THE CREWPERSON COULD BE
LOST.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-545
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-779X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM35
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
779
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOAAND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-546
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-483
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
483
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS BUT WOULD INCLUDE
ELECTRICAL OPENS ANYWHERE ALONG THE FEEDWATER VALVE CURRENT PATH.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-547
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-761X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
EMU
761
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FIALURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE FAILURE MODE IS
NOT DETECTABLE AND DOESN'T HAVE AUTOMATIC BACKUP FOR THE REQUIRED
FUNCTION. THE IOA THEREFORE RECOMMENDS INCLUSION IN THE CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-548
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-762X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
762
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-549
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
EMU-763X
350-FM7
EMU
763
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[ ]
C ]
C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
C
C
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-550
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-764X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
764
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCYSCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-551
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-765X
NASA FMEA #: 350-FM9
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
765
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-552
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-458
NASA FMEA #: 351-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
458
BITE INDICATOR (ITEM 363)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BECAUSE A FAILED ON BITE INDICATOR CAN CREATE A QUESTION OF
SYSTEM VERACITY, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY. THIS IS
ALSO BASED ON THE FACT MISSION TERMINATION WILL OCCUR ONCE
DETECTED DURING A PERIODIC SEQUENCE CHECK.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-553
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-457
NASA FMEA #: 351-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
457
BITE INDICATOR (ITEM 363)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-554
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/I0/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-459
NASA FMEA #: 351-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
459
ALPHANUMERIC DISPLAY (ITEM 369)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA INCLUDING PARTIAL DISPLAY LOSS IN
THIS FAILURE MODE AND WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS RESULTS. HOWEVER,
THE IOA RECOMMENDS THAT UPON DETECTION DURING PERIODIC STATUS
CHECK (OR TONE GENERATION) THE MISSION BE TERMINATED THEREFORE A
HARDWARE CRITICALITY OF "2". THE IOA DOES NOT SEE A SECOND
FAILURE AS CAUSING LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO TONE AVAILABILITY AND THE
REQUIREMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT HARDWARE FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-555
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-780X
NASA FMEA #: 351-FM4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
780
DISPLAY (ITEM 351)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ClL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-556
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-781X
NASA FMEA #: 351-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
781
DISPLAY (ITEM 351)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-557
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
_'. 8/06/87.J •
EMU-782X
351-FM6
EMU
782
DISPLAY (ITEM 351)
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ALITY REDUND_CY SCREENS
_GHT
FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
3 ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
] C ] [ ] C ]
[ ] .
[ ]
[ ]
•IS: (If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
)N RATIONALE : (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
I_E NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
,°
PAGE IS
OF P(X_ QUALITY
)2/25/88 C-558
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/i0/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-392
NASA FMEA #: 360-FMI, FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
392
VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-559
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-393
NASA FMEA #: 360-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
393
VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-560
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-733X
NASA FMEA #: 360-FM3, FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
733
VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-561
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-734X
NASA FMEA #: 360-FM4, FM9
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
734
COLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-562
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-391
NASA FMEA #: 360-FM5, FMI0
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
391
VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-563
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-393A
NASA FMEA #: 360-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
393
VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/2R CRITICALITY DUE TO AVAILABILITY OF
SECOND VOLUME CONTROL CHANNEL AND TO MAINTAIN CONSISTENCY WITH
NASA FMEA 360-FM2.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-564
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-396
NASA FMEA #: 361-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
396
DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA BELIEVES THE
WORST CASE SCENARIO CAN INCLUDE EVA OPERATIONS ON THE DEEP SPACE
SIDE OF THE EARTH WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT LUNAR REFLECTION. PAYLOAD
BAY LIGHTING, ALTHOUGH AVAILABLE, CANNOT ENSURE
READABILITY. THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY AND
INCLUSION IN THE CIL. THIS WILL ACCOUNT FOR MISSION TIMELINE
IMPACTS RESULTING FROM FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE LIGHT SOURCE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-565
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-398
NASA FMEA #: 361-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
398
DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOGNIZES THE INCORPORATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE
NASA FMEA 361-FMI; HOWEVER, FOR THE SAME REASONS STATED IN IOA
ASSESSMENT ID EMU-396 THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-566
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-735X
NASA FMEA #: 361-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
735
DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA BELIEVES THE
WORST CASE SCENARIO CAN INCLUDE EVA OPERATIONS ON THE DEEP SPACE
SIDE OF THE EARTH WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT LUNAR REFLECTION. PAYLOAD
BAY LIGHTING, ALTHOUGH AVAILABLE, CANNOT ENSURE
THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION IN
THE CIL. THIS WILL ACCOUNT FOR MISSION TIMELINE IMPACTS
RESULTING FROM FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE LIGHT SOURCE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-567
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-397
NASA FMEA #: 361-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
397
DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-568
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-399
NASA FMEA #: 361-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
399
DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FOR THE WORST CASE WHERE THE DISPLAY INTENSITY IS AT ITS LOWEST
VALUE, THE DISPLAY COULD BE UNREADABLE FOR THE EVA MISSION. IF
THIS WERE TO OCCUR, THE MISSION TIMELINE COULD BE IMPACTED BY THE
CREWPERSON ATTEMPTING TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE LIGHT SOURCE.
THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A CRITICALITY OF 2/2.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-569
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-736X
NASA FMEA #: 361-FM5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
736
DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] C ] -[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA BELIEVES THE WORST CASE SCENARIO CAN
INCLUDE EVA OPERATIONS ON THE DEEP SPACE SIDE OF THE EARTH
WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT LUNAR REFLECT. PAYLOAD BAY LIGHTING CANNOT
ENSURE READABILITY. THEREFORE THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2
CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION IN THE CIL. THIS WILL ACCOUNT FOR
MISSION TIMELINE IMPACTS RESULTING FROM EFFORTS TO FIND AN
ACCEPTABLE LIGHT SOURCE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-570
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-410
NASA FMEA #: 362-FMI
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
410
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-571
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-400
NASA FMEA #: 362-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
400
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE CAUSES
SHOULD BE REVISED TO BE MORE COMPREHENSIVE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-572
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-401
NASA FMEA #: 362-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
401
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT AND IS IN
AGREEMENT WITH THE REMAINING ANALYSIS. HOWEVER, THE CAUSES
SHOULD BE REVISED TO BE MORE COMPREHENSIVE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-573
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-411
NASA FMEA #: 362-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
411
EVC SELECTORSWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS A "FAIL OPERATIONAL" FAILURE FOR MODE A
AND BECAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY DOES NOT FURTHER IMPACT IT, THE
IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/3 CRITICALITY. THE IOAAND THE NASA SCREEN
ASSIGNMENTS ARE IN AGP_EMENT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-574
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-402
NASA FMEA #: 362-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
402
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT OF CAUSES.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-575
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-403
NASA FMEA #: 362-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
403
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B
REGARDING WHICH THE IOA NOW AGREES WITH THE NASA. THE IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT OF CAUSES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-412
NASA FMEA #: 362-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
412
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [NA] [
[P] [P] [NA] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS "FAIL OPERATIONAL" FOR MODE B AND BECAUSE
FURTHER LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IS NO IMPACT TO MODE B, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A 3/3 CRITICALITY. THE IOA AND THE NASA SCREENS ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-577
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-404
NASA FMEA #: 362-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
404
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT OF CAUSES.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-578
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-405
NASA FMEA #: 362-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
405
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B
REGARDING WHICH THE IOA NOW AGREES WITH THE NASA ASSIGNMENT.
ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT
OF CAUSES.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-579
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-406
NASA FMEA #: 362-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
406
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR SCREEN B WHICH
THE IOA NOW CONCURS WITH.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-580
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-407
NASA FMEA #: 362-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
407
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR SCREEN B;
REGARDING WHICH THE IOA NOW CONCURS WITH THE NASA FINDING.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-581
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-413
NASA FMEA #: 362-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
413
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CIL
ITEM
[ P ] [ F ] [ NA] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS "FAIL OPERATIONAL" AND BECAUSE FURTHER
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IS NO IMPACT TO BACKUP MODE, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A 3/3 CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-582
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-408
NASA FMEA #: 362-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM :
EMU
408
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-583
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-409
NASA FMEA #: 362-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
409
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT. THE IOA NOW
CONCURS WITH THE NASA SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-584
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-423
NASA FMEA #: 364-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
423
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-585
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-419
NASA FMEA #: 364-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
419
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY RI_DUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT AND THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-586
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-417A BASELINE [ ]
364-FMII NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
417
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-587
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-418A
NASA FMEA #: 364-FM12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
418
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-588
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-415
NASA FMEA #: 364-FM13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
415
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-589
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-414
NASA FMEA #: 364-FM14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
414
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-590
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-416
NASA FMEA #: 364-FM15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
416
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-591
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-414A BASELINE [ ]
364-FM16 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU
414
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-592
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-415A
NASA FMEA #: 364-FM17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
415
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY DUE TO MISSION TERMINATION
IMPACT AND BECAUSE THE OTHER FAILURES WHICH CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE ARE NOT REDUNDANT IN NATURE OR FUNCTION AND THEREFORE, PER
22206, CANNOT BE EMPLOYED TO UPGRADE FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-593
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-426
NASA FMEA #: 364-FM18
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
426
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-594
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-425 BASELINE [ ]
364-FM19 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
425
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-595
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-424
NASA FMEA #: 364-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
424
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-596
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/I0/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-421
NASA FMEA #: 364-FM3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
421
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-597
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-420
NASA FMEA #: 364-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
420
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-598
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-422
NASA FMEA #: 364-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
422
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT' DATE 02/25/88 C-599
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-420A BASELINE [ ]
364-FM6 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
420
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-600
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-421A
NASA FMEA #: 364-FM7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
421
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-601
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-418
NASA FMEA #: 364-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
418
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-602
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-417
NASA FMEA #: 364-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
417
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-603
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-427
NASA FMEA #: 365-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
427
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-604
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-435
NASA FMEA #: 365-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
435
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ F ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECO_ENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] IF]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-605
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
EMU-436
365-FM3
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
436
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ F ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-606
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-432
365-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
EMU
432
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOGNIZES THE INCORPORATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IN NASA
FMEA 365-FM4; HOWEVER, THE IOA EFFECTS DIFFER. THE IOA BELIEVES
THE VOX POSITION COULD BE LOST (IT IS NORMALLY IN OPEN POSITION)
AND WOULD REQUIRE LOSS OF A REDUNDANT FUNCTION (E.G., PTT)
TO CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-607
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-433
NASA FMEA #: 365-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
433
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-608
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-434
NASA FMEA #: 365-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
434
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ p ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-609
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-429
NASA FMEA #: 365-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
429
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-610
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-430A
NASA FMEA #: 365-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
430
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/2R CRITICALITY TO REFLECT MISSION IMPACT
WITH LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. FURTHER REVIEW ALSO INDICATES THE
SCREEN B SHOULD BE PASSED. ADDITIONALLY, A FAILURE SUCH AS THIS
ON THE IMPACTED LINE SHOULD REFLECT THE WORST CASE FOR THE
FAILURE ON ALL OF THE OUTPUTS (PTT MOMENTARY, VOX, OR VOX
DISABLE). ALSO, THE IOA NOW RECOMMENDS PASSAGE OF SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-611
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-430
NASA FMEA #: 365-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
430
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT AND IS IN
AGREEMENT ON THE REMAINDER OF THE ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-612
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-431
NASA FMEA #: 365-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
431
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. A 3/2R CRITICALITY IS
RECOMMENDED DUE TO CAPABILITY OF CREWPERSON TO SWITCH TO A
REDUNDANT COMMUNICATIONS POSITION (E.G. VOX).
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-613
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/i0/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
EMU-444
366-FMI
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
444
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-614
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-437
NASA FMEA #: 366-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
437
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-615
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-443
NASA FMEA #: 366-FM2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
443
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT DUE TO CAPABILITY TO
RESPOND AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-616
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-441
NASA FMEA #: 366-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
441
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, FURTHER REVIEW
INDICATES THAT SUCH A FAILURE WHEN COMBINED WITH A HARD CHARGE,
AN ITEM 172 FAILURE, AND AN SOP FAILURE COULD RESULT IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE (REFERENCE NASA FMEA 366-FM6). THE IOA
THEREFORE NOW RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY. (NOTE: THIS
ASSIGNMENT ALSO ENSURES CONSISTENCY BETWEEN FAILURE MODES WITHIN
THE EMU.)
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-617
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-438
NASA FMEA #: 366-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
438
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-618
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-701X
NASA FMEA #: 366-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
701
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS AND SCENARIO.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-619
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-702X
NASA FMEA #: 366-FM6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
702
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[P] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-620
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-445
NASA FMEA #: 367-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
445
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-621
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
EMU-450
367-FM2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
450
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-622
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-449
NASA FMEA #: 367-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
449
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA SCENARIO WOULD REQUIRE CREW ERROR
DURING EVA TO SUPPORT THE IOA CRITICALITY. THE IOA THEREFORE
AGREES WITH THE NASA FINDINGS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-623
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-446
NASA FMEA #: 367-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
446
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-624
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-447
NASA FMEA #: 367-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
447
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY TO ADDRESS POSSIBLE SHORT
CIRCUIT FROM OPEN TO CLOSE LINES. THIS CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF
COOLING AND CONDENSATE REMOVAL; THEREBY, REQUIRING SOP USAGE.
THE CONCURRENT LOSS OF THE SOP CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE.
THE IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS MODIFYING THE FAILURE MODE DESCRIPTION.
THE SCREEN B HAS BEEN FURTHER REVIEWED AND IS NOW RECOMMENDED TO
BE PASSED.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-625
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-448
NASA FMEA #: 367-FM6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
448
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ANALYSIS ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-626
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-451
NASA FMEA #: 368-FMI
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
451
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ P ] [ NA]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-627
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-453
NASA FMEA #: 368-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
453
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY TO REFLECT OCCURANCE OF
CONVERTER SHUTDOWN RESULTING IN MISSION TERMINATION AND, IF
COMBINED WITH A CO2 CONTROL FUNCTION FAILURE, POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE. ALSO, UPON FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA WOULD RECOMMEND FAILURE
OF
SCREEN B DUE TO THE FAILURE BEING NOT READILY DETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-628
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-452
NASA FMEA #: 368-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
452
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ NA]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-629
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-454
NASA FMEA #: 368-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
454
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B. THE REMAINING ANALYSIS
ARE IN AGREEMENT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-630
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-737X
NASA FMEA #: 368-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
737
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-631
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-455
NASA FMEA #: 368-FM6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
455
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-632
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-456
NASA FMEA #: 368-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
456
CAUTION AND WARNINGSWITCH (ITEM 368)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] C ] C ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-633
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-703X
NASA FMEA #: 368-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
703
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[x ] *
Ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-634
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-739X
NASA FMEA #: 384-FMI
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
739
DCM TMG (ITEM 384)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-635
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/i0/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-388
NASA FMEA #: 385-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
388
HARD UPPER TORSO (HUT) INTERFACE (ITEM 385)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-636
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-389
NASA FMEA #: 385-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
389
HARD UPPER TORSO (HUT) INTERFACE (ITEM 385)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-637
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-390
NASA FMEA #: 385-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
390
HARD UPPER TORSO (HUT) INTERFACE (ITEM 385)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT (ALSO REFERENCE MDAC ID
389).
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-638
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-738X
NASA FMEA #: 385-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
738
SUIT PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 311)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-639
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-474
NASA FMEA #: 385-FM4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
474
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-640
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-473
NASA FMEA #: 385-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
473
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT TO GROUND WILL RESULT IN EXCESSIVE CURRENT DRAW FROM
VEHICLE POWER UNTIL FINALLY LOST. THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS
A 2/2 CRITICALITY TO REFLECT MISSION IMPACTS, AND INCLUSION IN
THE CIL FOR THIS FAILURE MODE. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA RECOMMENDS
MODIFICATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE TO SHORTS TO GROUND.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-641
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-323
NASA FMEA #: 410-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
323
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT AND IS IN
AGREEMENT WITH THE REMAINING ANALYSIS. THE IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE TWO FAILURE MODES, 410-FMI AND FM2, TO REFLECT THE
ENTIRE MISSION SCENARIO.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-642
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-323A
NASA FMEA #: 410-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
323
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY BECAUSE THIS FAILURE MODE
WAS LIMITED TO THE EVA PHASE AND DID NOT ENCOMPASS THE ENTIRE
MISSION WHICH WOULD HAVE INDICATED A 2/2. IF DONE (REFERENCE
NASA FMEA 410-FMI) . THE IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS COMBINING 410-FMI
AND
FM2 INTO ONE FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-643
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-325
NASA FMEA #: 410-FM3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
325
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] C P ] C P ]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BECAUSE THE NASA LIMITED THIS FAILURE TO SELECTED MISSION PHASES
THE IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING IT WITH NASA FMEA 410-FM4 WITH A 2/2
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-644
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-325A
NASA FMEA #: 410-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
325
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA SCENARIO IS NOT AS REPRESENTATIVE THE WORST CASE AS IS
NASA; THE IOA, THEREFORE, AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS COMBINING NASA FMEAs 410-FM3 AND FM4 TO
REPRESENT THE ENTIRE MISSION SCENARIO UNDER ONE ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-645
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-324
NASA FMEA #: 410-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
324
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] *
CX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA SPLIT THE MISSION PHASES FOR THIS FAILURE MODE BETWEEN
NASA FMEAs 410-FM5, FM6, AND FM7. THE IOA RECOMMENDS THEY BE
COMBINED AS ONE FMEA AND WITH A 2/2 CRITICALITY. (NOTE: THE IOA
AGREED WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS IN 41-FM6).
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-646
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-324A
NASA FMEA #: 410-FM6, FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
324
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS. THE IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS
COMBINING NASA FMEAs 410-FM5, FM6, AND FM7 TO REFLECT THE ENTIRE
MISSION SCENARIO FOR THIS FAILURE MODE UNDER ONE ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-647
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-326
NASA FMEA #: 410-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
326
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REM_kRKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY WHEN THE SECOND SCU IS
NOT CONSIDERED REDUNDANT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-648
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/i0/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-327
NASA FMEA #: 410-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
327
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ NA]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-649
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-336
NASA FMEA #: 411-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
336
HIGH PRESSURE OXYGEN LINE (ITEM 411)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY SINCE THE SECOND SCU IS
NOT EMPLOYED AS A REDUNDANT ITEM.
REPORT DATE 02125/88 C-650
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-337
NASA FMEA #: 412A-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
337
PORTABLE H20 LINE (ITEM 412A)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT WHEN THE
SECOND SCU IS CONSIDERED TO BE NON-REDUNDANT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-651
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/i0/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-338
NASA FMEA #: 412B&C-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
338
COOLING H20 IN-LINE (ITEM 412B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT SINCE THE
SECOND SCU IS NON-REDUNDANT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-652
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-339
NASA FMEA #: 412B&C-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
339
COOLING H20 OUT-LINE (ITEM 412C)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT SINCE THE
SECOND SCU IS NON-REDUNDANT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-653
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-340
NASA FMEA #: 416-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
340
BACTERIAL FILTER HOUSING (ITEM 416)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY DUE TO THE SECOND SCU
NOT BEING CONSIDERED REDUNDANT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-654
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-343
NASA FMEA #: 418-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
343
CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-655
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-345
NASA FMEA #: 418-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
345
CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] .
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-656
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-344
NASA FMEA #: 418-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
344
CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITI CALI TY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-657
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-346
NASA FMEA #: 418-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
346
CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-658
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-347
NASA FMEA #: 418-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
347
CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS RESULTS AND EFFECTS.
THE IOA WOULD RECOMMEND INCLUDING "CAM BINDING" AS A VIABLE
CAUSE.
ALSO,
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-659
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-341
NASA FMEA #: 418-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
341
CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY DUE TO NON-REDUNDANCY OF
SCUs.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-660
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-349
NASA FMEA #: 419-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
349
WATER SUPPLY PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 419 )
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BECAUSE THE SECOND SCU IS NOT REDUNDANT (BY GROUND RULE) AND
BECAUSE RECHARGE IS TERMINATED UPON DETECTION OF THIS FAILURE
MODE, THE IOARECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY. ADDITIONALLY, THE
IOA DOES CONSIDER THE ITEM 419 CAPABLE OF GROUND TEST FOR THIS
FAILURE MODE AND THEREFORE RECOMMENDS PASSAGE OF SCREEN A.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-661
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-350
NASA FMEA #: 419-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
350
WATER SUPPLY PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 419)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BECAUSE THE SECOND SCU IS CONSIDERED NON-REDUNDANT, THE IOA
AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-662
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-348 BASELINE [ ]
419-FM3 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU
348
WATER SUPPLY PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 419)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY AND ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-663
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-357
NASA FMEA #: 420-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
357
02 FILTER AND ORIFICE (ITEM 420)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] C ] C ]
[P] CP] CP]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY DUE TO NON-REDUNDANCY OF
THE SECOND SCU.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-664
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-356
NASA FMEA #: 420-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
356
02 FILTER AND ORIFICE (ITEM 420)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
C ] C ] C ]
[P] CP] CP]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY DUE TO NON-REDUNDANCY OF
SECOND SCU.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-665
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-353
NASA FMEA #: 423-FMI, FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
353
BACTERIA CARTRIDGE (ITEM 423)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOAAND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREENS A
AND B; REGARDING WHICH THE IOA NOW CONCURS WITH THE NASA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-666
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/I0/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-352
NASA FMEA #: 423-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
352
BACTERIA CARTRIDGE (ITEM 423)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-667
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-351
NASA FMEA #: 423-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
351
BACTERIA CARTRIDGE (ITEM 423)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BECAUSE THE SECOND SCU IS NOT EMPLOYED AS REDUNDANT, THE IOA
AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-668
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-354
424-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
354
POTABLE H20 FILTER (ITEM 424)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BECAUSE THE SECOND SCU IS NOT CONSIDERED REDUNDANT, THE IOA
AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-669
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
EMU-355
424-FM2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
355
POTABLE H20 FILTER (ITEM 424)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-670
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-332 BASELINE [ ]
425-FMI NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
332
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-671
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-333
NASA FMEA #: 425-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
333
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-672
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-328
NASA FMEA #: 425-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
328
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-673
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-329
NASA FMEA #: 425-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
329
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [
[P] [P] [
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-674
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-334
NASA FMEA #: 425-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
334
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO DEFINED NON-REDUNDANCY OF SCUs, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-675
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-335
NASA FMEA #: 425-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
335
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IX] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS DUE TO NON-REDUNDANCY OF
SCU.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-676
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-330
NASA FMEA #: 425-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
330
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS (DUE TO NON-REDUNDANT
SCUs).
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-677
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-331
NASA FMEA #: 425-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
331
COMMONMULTIPLE CONNECTOR(ITEM 410)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO THE SECOND SCU BEING NON-REDUNDANT, THE IOA AGREES WITH
THE NASA ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-678
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-749X
NASA FMEA #: 425-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
749
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-679
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-750X
NASA FMEA #: 425-FM9
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
750
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-680
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-783X
NASA FMEA #: 440-=FM5
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 783
ITEM: EEH
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] C P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
C ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-681
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-743X
NASA FMEA #: 470-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
743
AIRLOCK ADAPTER PLATE (ITEM 470)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-682
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-744X
NASA FMEA #: 470-FM2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
744
AIRLOCK ADAPTER PLATE (ITEM 470)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ -]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-683
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-745X
NASA FMEA #: 470-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
745
AIRLOCK ADAPTER PLATE (ITEM 470)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] IF] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-684
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-746X
NASA FMEA #: 480-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
746
CONTAMINATE CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN A;
HOWEVER, UPON FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN
A ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-193
NASA FMEA #: 480-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
193
CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. (ALSO REFERENCE MDAC ID-
194) .
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-194
NASA FMEA #: 480-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
194
CONTAMINANTCONTROLCARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. (ALSO REFERENCE MDAC ID-
193).
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-196
NASA FMEA #: 480-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
196
CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT; HOWEVER, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B. THIS RECOMMENDATION IS MADE
BECAUSE THE DETECTION METHOD IDENTIFIED BY THE NASA IS AN EFFECT
OF THE FAILURE HAVING OCCURED SOME PREVIOUS TIME AND IS
THEREFORE NOT READILY DETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-688
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
EMU-747 BASELINE [
480-FM4 NEW [
EMU
747
CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE MODE NON CREDIBLE FOR AN FMEA.
THE FAILURE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN A HAZARD ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-689
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-748X
NASA FMEA #: 480-FM5, FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
748
CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-690
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-192 BASELINE [ ]
480-FM7 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
192
CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-691
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-192A
NASA FMEA #: 480-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
192
CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA FAILURE MODE IMPLIES THE FAILURE OF THE SOP TO MAKE UP
OXYGEN FLOW DUE TO THE SEVERITY OF THE FAILURE MODE. THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A 2/iRb, c CRITICALITY TO MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT THIS
SCENARIO AND A COMBINATION OF NASA FMEAs 480-FM7 AND FM8 UNDER
A SINGLE ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-692
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-290
NASA FMEA #: 490-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
290
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
J
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-693
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-292
NASA FMEA #: 490-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
292
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-694
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-289
NASA FMEA #: 490-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 289
ITEM: BATTERY (ITEM 490)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY TO REFLECT POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE RESULTING FROM A VIOLENT RUPTURE OF THE BATTERY DUE TO A
CONCURRENT SHORT WHICH GENERATES HYDROGEN GAS. THE IOA DOES
AGREE WITH THE NASA SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-695
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-288
NASA FMEA #: 490-FM3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
288
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
NDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [P] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT, HOWEVER, THE
IOA RECOMMENDS PASSAGE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE A DEGRADATION/FAILURE
OF BATTERY WOULD BE DETECTED AND SOP USAGE WOULD BE THE
CORRECTIVE ACTION.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-696
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-287
NASA FMEA #: 490-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 287
ITEM: BATTERY (ITEM 490)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA SCREEN A ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-291
NASA FMEA #: 490-FM5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
291
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
D-I
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
131/162-FMI
131/162-FM3
131/162-FM2
131/162-FM1
131/162-FM3
131/162-FM2
148-FM1
148-FM3
148-FM2
132B-FMI
132B-FM2, FM3
132B-FM5
132B-FM4
142-FMI
142-FM3
143-FMI
143-FM2
143-FM3
136-FM2
136-FM3
136-FMI
136-FM4
135-FMI
135-FM3
135-FM2
137-FM4
137-FM5
137-FMI
137-FM2
137-FM6
137-FM3
138-FMI
138-FM2
138-FM3
140-FM8
140-FM2
140-FM7
140-FM6
140-FM5
140-FM9
140-FM4
139-FM5
125-FMI
125-FM2
I00
I01
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
ii0
iii
112
113
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
145
147
148
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
RESERVE H20 TANK
RESERVE H20 TANK
RESERVE H20 TANK
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE
WATER RELIEF VALVE
WATER RELIEF VALVE
WATER CHECK VALVE
WATER CHECK VALVE
WATER CHECK VALVE
FEEDWATER PRESSURE
FEEDWATER PRESSURE
FEEDWATER PRESSURE
FEEDWATER PRESSURE
FEEDWATER RELIEF VLV
FEEDWATER RELIEF VLV
FEEDWATER RELIEF VLV
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VLV
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VLV
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VLV
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VLV
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VLV
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VLV
FEEDWATER PRESSURE
FEEDWATER PRESSURE
FEEDWATER PRESSURE
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
TEMPERATURE SENSOR
TEMPERATURE SENSOR
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE
BLADDER FAILURE
LEAK-O2 SIDE EXT
LEAK-H20 SIDE
BLADDER FAILURE
LEAK-O2 SIDE
LEAK-H20 SIDE
BLADDER FAILURE
LEAK-O2 SIDE
LEAK-H20 SIDE
BIASED HIGH
BIASED LOW
EXTERNAL H20 LEAK
INTERNAL SHORT
INTERNAL LKG
EXTERNAL LKG
INTERNAL LKG
FAILS CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
REGULATES HIGH
REGULATES LOW
INTERNAL LKG
EXTERNAL LKG
INTERNAL LKG
EXTERNAL LKG
FAILS TO OPEN
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS OPEN
ELECTRONICS SHORT
EXCESSIVE/CONTINU
BIASED HIGH
BIASED LOW
INTERNAL SHORT
EXTERNAL H20 FDW
SUBLIMATOR BLOCKE
EXTERNAL LCG H20
INTERNAL LCG-TO-F
INTERNAL LCG-VENT
EXTERNAL VENT LOO
SLURPER BLOCKED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
ELECTRICAL SHORT
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
D-2
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
125-FM3
125-FM4
125-FM4
128-FM3
128-FMI
128-FM2
127-FM3
127-FM2
127-FMI
14 I-FM4
141-FMI, FM3
141-FM2
141-FM5
134-FM3
134-FMI
134-FM2
134-FM2
171-FM5
171-FM2, FM4
17 I-FMI
171-FM3
171-FMI
171-FM6
172-FM3
172-FMI
172-FM2
123-FM4
123-FM6
123-FM9
123-FM6
123-FM5
123-FM7
123-FM3
123-FMI
123-FM9
123-FMI0
123-FMI0
123-FM8
123-FMII
170-FMI
480-FM7
480-FM8
480-FM2
480-FM2
480-FM3
12 I-FM5
12 I-FM3
12 I-FM2
121-FM4
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
192
193
194
196
197
198
199
20O
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE
CHECK VALVE AND HOUSI
CHECK VALVE AND HOUSI
CHECK VALVE AND HOUSI
PUMP INLET FILTER
PUMP INLET FILTER
PUMP INLET FILTER
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
CONDENSATE H20 RELIEF
CONDENSATE H20 RELIEF
CONDENSATE H20 RELIEF
CONDENSATE H20 RELIEF
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE
ROTARY H20 SEPARATOR
ROTARY H20 SEPARATOR
ROTARY H20 SEPARATOR
WATER PUMP (ITEM 123C)
WATER PUMP (ITEM 123C)
WATER PUMP (ITEM 123C)
FAN (ITEM 123A)
FAN (ITEM 123A)
BRUSHLESS MOTOR
BRUSHLESS MOTOR
BRUSHLESS MOTOR
BRUSHLESS MOTOR
BRUSHLESS MOTOR
MUFFLER (ITEM 170)
CONTAMINANT CONTROL
CONTAMINANT CONTROL
CONTAMINANT CONTROL
CONTAMINANT CONTROL
CONTAMINANT CONTROL
CHECK VALVE AND VENT
CHECK VALVE AND VENT
CHECK VALVE AND VENT
CHECK VALVE AND VENT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INLET FILTER BLOC
FAILS CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL H20 LEAK
FAILED CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
BLOCKED
PASSAGE OF CONTAM
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
GAS BREAKTHROUGH
SCREEN BLOCKED
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OPEN
BLOCKED INLET FIL
VALVE FAILS CLOSE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS CLOSED (NO
CONTINUOUS MOTOR
FILTER ELEMENT BL
ELECTRICAL SHORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OPEN
BLOCKED INLET FIL
VALVE FAILS CLOSE
PITOT TUBE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
BEARINGS BIND
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
REDUCED FLOW
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LOW FLOW
BEARINGS BIND
FAILS OFF
LOW SPEED
HIGH SPEED
SHORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
PARTICULATE FILTER
TEFLON SCREEN PAR
LiOH RELEASED TO
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
VALVE FAILS CLOSE
SENSOR FAILS LOW
VALVE FAILS OPEN
D-3
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
12 I-FMI
122-FM5
122-FMI
122-FM2
122-FM4
126-FM2
126-FMI
II4-FM3, FM4
II4-FM6
II4-FM5
145-FMI
145-FM2
146-FM2
146-FMI
146-FM3
147-FMI
147-FM2
II3A-FM3
II3A-FM4
II3A-FMI
II3A-FM2
II3B-FM3
II3B-FMI
II3B-FM2
II3C-FM3
II3C-FM2
II3C-FMI
II3D-FM4
II3D-FMI
II3D-FM2
II3D-FM3
II3D-FM3
II3D-FM5, FM6
II3E-FM5
II3E-FMI
II3E-FM2
II3E-FM4
II3E-FM3
III-FM2
III-FMI
II2-FM7
II2-FMI
II2-FM3
112-FM4
II2-FM2
II2-FM5
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
210
211
212
213
214
216
217
218
219
220
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
25O
251
252
253
CHECK VALVE AND VENT
CHECK VALVE AND VENT
CO2 TRANSDUCER
CO2 TRANSDUCER
CO2 TRANSDUCER
CO2 TRANSDUCER
FILTER AND ORIFICE
FILTER AND ORIFICE
PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR
PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR
PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR
RELIEF VALVE AND ORIF
RELIEF VALVE AND ORIF
POSITIVE PRESSURE REL
POSITIVE PRESSURE REL
POSITIVE PRESSURE REL
NEGATIVE PRESSURE REL
NEGATIVE PRESSURE REL
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
ADJUSTABLE ORIFICE
ADJUSTABLE ORIFICE
ADJUSTABLE ORIFICE
ON/OFF VALVE
ON/OFF VALVE
ON/OFF VALVE
PRIMARY REGULATOR
PRIMARY REGULATOR
PRIMARY REGULATOR
PRIMARY REGULATOR
PRIMARY REGULATOR
PRIMARY REGULATOR
H20 REGULATOR
H20 REGULATOR
H20 REGULATOR
H20 REGULATOR
H20 REGULATOR
PRIMARY OXYGEN BOTTLE
PRIMARY OXYGEN BOTTLE
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE
SENSOR FAILS HIGH
SHORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
SENSOR FAILS HIGH
SENSOR FAILS LOW
ELECTRICAL SHORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
ORIFICE BLOCKED
BIASED LOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL SHORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INLET OR OUTLET
INLET FILTER FAIL
OUTLET FILTER FAIL
VALVE FAILS CLOSE
VALVE FAILS OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FLOW-BLOCKED
HIGH FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILED CLOSED
FAILED OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS CLOSED
REGULATES LOW
REGULATES HIGH
IV-EV LINKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OPEN-INTERN
REGULATES HIGH
REGULATES LOW
FAILS CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RUPTURE-VIOLENT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
DRIFTS LOW
FAILS FULL LOW
DRIFTS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
BOURDON TUBE RUPT
D-4
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
II2-FM6
II5-FMI6
II5-FMI8
II5-FMI3
II5-FMI4
II5-FMI5
II5-FMI
II5-FM2
II5-FM3
II5-FM4
II5-FM7
II5-FM8
II5-FM5
II5-FM6
II5-FM9
II5-FMI0
II5-FMI2
II6-FMI
II6-FM2
120A-FM3
120A-FM2
120B-FMI
120B-FM2, FM3
120B-FM5
120B-FM4
120C-FM3
120C-FMI
132A-FM5
132A-FM2, FM3
132A-FM4
490-FM4
490-FM3
490-FM2
490-FMI
490-FM5
490-FMI
200-FM2
210-FMI
210-FM2
215- FM3
215-FM4
215-FM5
215-FM6
215-FM2
215-FMI, FM7
213B-FM4
213B-FM3
213B-FM2
213B-FM2
254
255
256
257
258
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
271
272
273
274
276
277
278
279
280
282
283
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
295
295
296
297
298
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
3O5
306
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
EVA POSITION SWITCH
EVA POSITION SWITCH
BLEED ORIFICE
BLEED ORIFICE
DUAL MODE RELIEF VLV
DUAL MODE RELIEF VLV
DUAL MODE RELIEF VLV
DUAL MODE RELIEF VLV
FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE
FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
SECONARY 02 BOTTLE
SECONARY 02 BOTTLE
SECONARY 02 BOTTLE
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
IST STAGE REGULATOR
IST STAGE REGULATOR
IST STAGE REGULATOR
IST STAGE REGULATOR
IST STAGE REGULATOR
ELECTRICAL SHORT
02 MANIFOLD FILTER
02 MANIFOLD FILTE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS IN THE "OFF
FAILS IN THE "IV"
FAILS IN THE PRE
FAILS IN THE EVA
FAILURE TO OPEN
FAILURE TO CLOSE
FAILURE TO OPEN
FAILURE TO CLOSE
FAILURE TO PLACE
FAILURE TO PLACE
SLIDE ACTUATOR
FAILS OPEN-NO SIG
FAILS CLOSED-CONT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL CLOSED
FAILS CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILED CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILED LOW
INTERNAL SHORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RELIEF VALVE FAIL
RELIEF VALVE FAIL
GENERATION OF HYD
HIGH RESISTANCE
SHORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
BOTTLE RUPTURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
ELECTRONICS SHORT
READS HIGH
READS LOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
REGULATES HIGH
REGULATES LOW
FAILS CLOSED
D-5
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
213B-FMI
213D-FM7
213D-FMI
213D-FM5
213D-FM6
213D-FM9
213D-FMI0
213E-FM3
213E-FM4
213F-FMI
200-FMI
410-FMI
410-FM2
410-FM5
410-FM6, FM7
410-FM3
410- FM4
410-FM8
410-FM9
425-FM2
425-FM3
425-FM6
425-FM4
425-FM5
41 I-FMI
412A-FMI
412B&C-FMI
412B&C-FMI
416-FMI
418-FM4
418-FMI
418-FM2
418-FMI
418-FM2
418-FM3
419-FM3
419-FMI
419-FM2
423-FM4
423-FM3
423-FMI, FM2
424-FMI
424-FM2
420-FM2
420-FMI
311-FM4
314-FM3
307
308
309
311
312
312
313
314
315
318
320
321
322
323
323
324
324
325
325
326
327
328
329
330
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
359
360
364
IST STAGE REGULATOR
2ND STAGE REGULATOR
2ND STAGE REGULATOR
2ND STAGE REGULATOR
2ND STAGE REGULATOR
2ND STAGE REGULATOR
2ND STAGE REGULATOR
SOP PRESSURE GAGE
SOP PRESSURE GAGE
SOP FILL PORT QD
SOP FILL PORT QD
SOP ASSEMBLY
SOP ASSEMBLY
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
HIGH PRESSURE OXYGEN
PORTABLE H20 LINE
COOLING H20 IN-LINE
COOLING H20 OUT-LINE
BACTERIAL FILTER HOUS
CONDENSATE H20 REGULA
CONDENSATE H20 REGULA
CONDENSATE H20 REGULA
CONDENSATE H20 REGULA
CONDENSATE H20 REGULA
CONDENSATE H20 REGULA
WATER SUPPLY PRESSURE
WATER SUPPLY PRESSURE
WATER SUPPLY PRESSURE
BACTERIA CARTRIDGE
BACTERIA CARTRIDGE
BACTERIA CARTRIDGE
POTABLE H20 FILTER
POTABLE H20 FILTER
02 FILTER AND ORIFICE
02 FILTER AND ORIFICE
SUIT PRESSURE GAGE
SUIT PRESSURE GAGE
DCM PURGE VALVE
DIAPHRAM RUPTURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
REGULATES LOW
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS CLOSED
MECH LINKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
BOURDN TUBE RUPT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FILTER PASSES CON
BOTTLE INLET FILT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
CONNECTOR DOES NO
CONNECTOR DOES NO
ELECTRICAL POWER
ELECTRICAL POWER
OPEN IN VOLTAGE
BATTERY RECHARGE
BATTERY RECHARGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS CLOSED
REGULATES LOW
REGUALTES HIGH
MANUAL OVERRIDE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILED CLOSED
INLET SCREEN BLOC
INLET SECREEN BLO
FAILURE OF CARTRI
BLOCKED/CLOGGED
BLOCKED/CLOGGED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FILTER BLOCKED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
BOURDON TUBE RUPT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
D-6
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
314-FMI
314-FMI
314-FM2
314-FMI
330-FM2
330-FM5
330-FM6
330-FM3
330-FM4
330-FM19
330-FM20
330-FM9
330-FMI0
330-FM12
330-FM15
330-FM16
330-FM13
385-FMI
385-FM2
385-FM2
360-FM7
361-FMI
361-FMI
361-FM4
362-FM2
362-FM2
362-FM4
362-FM4
362-FM6
362-FM6
362-FM7
362-FM7
362-FM9
362-FMI
364-FM14
364-FM16
364-FM13
364-FM17
364-FM15
364-FMII
364-FM9
364-FM12
364-FM8
364-FMI0
364-FM4
365
366
367
368
369
370
370
371
371
372
373
374
375
377
378
379
383
384
387
388
389
390
393
394
395
396
398
399
4OO
401
402
403
404
4O5
406
407
4O8
410
414
414
415
415
416
417
417
418
418
419
420
DCM PURGE VALVE
DCM PURGE VALVE
DCM PURGE VALVE
DCM PURGE VALVE
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
HARD UPPER TORSO
HARD UPPER TORSO
HARD UPPER TORSO
VOLUME CONTROL
VOLUME CONTROL
VOLUME CONTROL
DISPLAY INTENSITY CON
DISPLAY INTENSITY CON
DISPLAY INTENSITY CON
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
POWER MODE SELECTOR
POWER MODE SELECTOR
POWER MODE SELECTOR
POWER MODE SELECTOR
POWER MODE SELECTOR
POWER MODE SELECTOR
POWER MODE SELECTOR
POWER MODE SELECTOR
POWER MODE SELECTOR
POWER MODE SELECTOR
POWER MODE SELECTOR
INLET FILTER BLOC
FAILED CLOSED
FAIL OPEN
REDUCED FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO MATE
FAILS TO DEMATE
OPEN IN POWER LIN
SHORT IN POWER
SHORT IN BATTERY
OPEN IN VOLTAGE
SHORT IN VOLTAGE
BATTERY RECHARGE
OXYGEN FLOW BLOCK
LCG IN/OUT VALVE
VENT LOOP INTERFA
COOLING LOOP INTE
POTABLE H20 LEAKA
SHORT IN ONE COMM
SHORT ACROSS TWO
INCREASED RESISTA
OPEN IN LINE
INCREASED RESISTA
SHAFT BINDS
OPEN IN PRIMARY
OPEN IN SECONDARY
OPEN IN PRIMARY
OPEN IN SECONDARY
OPEN IN PRIMARY
OPEN IN SECONDARY
OPEN IN PRIMARY
OPEN IN SECONDARY
SHORT TO GROUND
SWITCH FAILS
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
D-7
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
364-FM6
364-FM3
364-FM7
364-FM5
364-FMI
364-FM2
364-FM19
364-FM18
365-FM5
366-FM2
366-FM4
366-FM3
366-FM2
367-FMI
367-FM4
367-FM5
367-FM6
367-FM3
367-FM2
368-FMI
368-FM3
368-FM2
368-FM4
368-FM6
368-FM7
351-FM2
351-FMI
351-FM3
150-FM8
150-FM3
150-FMI0
150-FMII
350-FM16
350-FM17
350-FM15
385-FM5
385-FM4
350-FM3
350-FM3
350-FM23
350-FM31
350-FM4
420
421
421
422
423
424
425
426
434
437
438
439
440
441
443
445
446
447
448
449
45O
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
469
470
471
473
474
475
477
479
480
481
482
483
POWERMODE SELECTOR
POWERMODE SELECTOR
POWERMODE SELECTOR
POWERMODE SELECTOR
POWERMODE SELECTOR
POWERMODESELECTOR
POWERMODESELECTOR
POWERMODESELECTOR
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FEEDWATERVALVE SW
FEEDWATERVALVE SW
FEEDWATERVALVE SW
FEEDWATERVALVE SW
FEEDWATERVALVE SW
FEEDWATERVALVE SW
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTIONAND WARNING
CAUTIONAND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
BITE INDICATOR
BITE INDICATOR
ALPHANUMERIC DISPLAY
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS OPEN
SWITCH STAYS
SWITCH STAYS
SHORT-VEHICLE PWR
SHORT-BATTERY PWR
FAIL CLOSED
FAN POWER ON CONT
FAN POWER ON CONT
CLIV POWER "OPEN"
CLIV POWER "CLOSE
CLIV POWER SHORT
SWITCH FAILS OFF
ELECTRICAL OPEN
ELECTRICAL OPEN
ELECTRICAL SHORT
ELECTRICAL SHORT
SWITCH FAILS
SWITCH FAILS
OPEN IN STATUS
OPEN IN PROGRAM
SHORT TO GROUND
SHORT TO GROUND
BEARING FAILS
SWITCH FAILS
OPEN IN ELECTRICA
SHORT TO BITE IND
SUPPLY VOLTAGE
DISPLAY I/O PORT
MEMORY 5.V POWER
SYSTEM CLOCK OUTP
MULTIPLEXER INPUT
ANALOG TO DIGITAL
BITE CIRCUIT FAIL
BITE CIRCUIT FAIL
OPEN IN CURRENT
SHORT IN CURRENT
OPEN IN VOLTAGE
EMI FILTER SHORTS
EMI FILTER OPEN
EVC PRIMARY/CLIV
EVC SEC/FEEDWATER
EVC PRIMARY/CLIV
EVC SEC/FEEDWATER
EVC PRI/CLIV CURR
EVC SEC/FEEDWATER
EVC SEC/FEEDWATER
D-8
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
350-FMI
350-FM3
350-FM22
350-FM33
350-FM20
350-FM22
350-FM22
350-FM22
350-FM18
350-FM19
321-FM4
321-FMI, FM2
321-FM3
102-FM2
102-FMI
102-FM3
102-FM6
102-FMI6
I02-FM25
I02-FM26
I02-FM22
102-FMI0
102-FM20
102-FM21
102-FMI8
105-FM6
105-FM7
105-FMI
108-FM8
108-FM3
108-FM7
103-FMI5
103-FM5
103-FMI3, FMI4
103-FM6, FM8
103-FMI
103-FM4
103-FM9
103-FMI0
103-FM21
103-FM20
103-FMI9
I03-FM22
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
494
495
497
498
499
5OO
501
502
6OO
601
602
603
604
6O5
6O8
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
620
621
622
623
625
626
627
627
628
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
COOLING CONTROLVALVE
COOLING CONTROL VALVE
COOLING CONTROL VALVE
NECK RING
NECK RING
NECK RING
NECK RING
WATER LINE
WATER LINE
MULTIPLE WATER CONNEC
MULTIPLE WATER CONNEC
MULTIPLE WATER CONNEC
HARD UPPER TORSO SHEL
HARD UPPER TORSO SHEL
GIMBAL ASSY.
BELLOWS ASSEMBLY
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
COMBINATION PURGE VLV
COMBINATION PURGE VLV
HELMET ASSEMBLY
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR
UPPER/LOWER ARM RESTR
UPPER/LOWER ARM RESTR
UPPER/LOWERARM RESTR
UPPER/LOWER ARM RESTR
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
ARM BEARING ASSEMBLY
ARM BEARING ASSEMBLY
WRIST DISCONNECT
WRIST DISCONNECT
WRIST DISCONNECT
WRIST DISCONNECT
EVC PRIMARY/CLIV
OPEN IN POWER
OPEN IN POWER
OPEN IN POWER
SHORT TO GROUND
SHORT TO GROUND
SHORT TO GROUND
OPEN IN DC/DC CON
OPEN IN +14.2V
SHORT IN 3.8V OUT
SHORT IN +14.2V
SHORT IN 18V OUTP
OPEN IN LINE
FAILED ON TONE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
JAMS FULL COLD
JAM OF LOCK MECH
JAM OF LOCK MECH
LEAKAGE OF NECK
NECK RING FAILURE
WATER FLOWN BLOCK
WATER LINE LEAKAG
JAM. FAIL TO MAT
JAM. FAIL TO DEM
LEAKAGE-MATED
LEAKAGE
UNABLE TO MATE
DISATTACHMENT
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
FAIL CLOSED
FAIL OPEN
LEAKAGE
JAM OF SUN VISOR
CRACK IN SUN VISO
CRAZING
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
LEAKAGE
BEARING TORQUES
LEAKAGE
BEARING TORQUES
LOCK/JAM OPEN
LOCK JAM CLOSED
LEAKAGE
LOCK FAILURE
D-9
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
106-FMI
106-FM7
106-FM5
106-FM2
106-FM3
106-FM8
106-FMI0
106-FM13
106-FMI5
106-FM14
104-FM9
104-FMII
104-FMI3
104-FM21
I04-FM22
I04-FM24
I04-FM25
104-FM29
I04-FM34
I04-FM32
I04-FM33
104-FM4
104-FM3
104-FMI
107-FM2
107-FM3
107-FM6
107-FMI3
107-FMI7
107-FMI5
107-FMI6
II0-FMI
II0-FM4
II0-FM5
366-FM5
366-FM6
368-FM8
150-FMI
150-FM2
150-FM4
150-FM5
150-FM6
150-FM7
637
638
639
640
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
65O
651
651
652
653
654
654
656
657
658
660
660
662
665
666
667
668
669
671
672
675
676
677
678
679
68O
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
BLADDER ASSEMBLY
WRIST DISCONNECT
WRIST DISCONNECT
PALM RESTRAINT
PALM RESTRAINT
WAIST RESTRAINT
WAIST RESTRAINT
WAIST BEARING
WAIST BEARING
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT
BOOT DISCONNECT
PRESSURE BOOT ASSY
PRESSURE BOOT ASSY
PRESSURE BOOT ASSY
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
VENT MANIFOLD
MULTIUPLE CONNECTOR
MULTIUPLE CONNECTOR
MULTIUPLE CONNECTOR
BITE VALVE ASSEMBLY
BLADDER ASSEMBLY
BLADDER ASSEMBLY
ROLLON CUFF
VALVE
BLADDER
BLADDER
HARNESS
CCA
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
RESTRAINT LAYER
SIZING LINES
PALM BAR SEPARATE
PRIMARY AXIAL RES
PRIMARY AXIAL RES
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
BEARING TORQUE
PALM BAR RESTRAIN
PALM BAR BENT
LEAKAGE
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
LEAKAGE
BEARING TORQUES
LEAKAGE
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
JAMMED OPEN
JAMMED CLOSED
LEAKAGE
ZIPPER JAMMED
ZIPPER JAMMED
PUNCTURED OR LEAK
COMPLETE BLOCKAGE
WILL NOT MATE
LEAKAGE WHEN DEMA
LEAKAGE WHEN MATE
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
BAG DISLODGED
LEAKAGE
FAILS CLOSED
LEAKAGE
MISPOSITIONED
HARNESS LOOSE
LOSS OF POWER
CLIV SWITCH FAILS
CLIV SWITCH FAILS
LOSS OF INPUT PWR
5V POWER SUPPLY
5V REFERENCE SUPP
EMU TIMELINE MEMO
C&W TONE DISCRETE
C&W TONE DISCRETE
FAILURE OF PERMAN
D-10
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
150-FM9
150-FMI2
II5-FMI7
II5-FMI9
122-FM3
123-FM2
131/162-FM5
131/162-FM4
131/162-FM6
140-FMI
161-FMI
174-FM2
330-FM17
330-FM18
361-FM2
361-FM5
368-FM5
470-FMI
470-FM2
470-FM3
480-FMI
480-FM4
480-FM5, FM6
425-FM8
425-FM9
123-FM12
II4-FM7
II5-FM20
II5-FM21
140-FM3
140-FMI0
150-FMI3
150-FMI4
300-FM7
300-FM2
350-FM5
350-FM6
350-FMI0
350-FM24
350-FM25
350-FM26
350-FM27
350-FM32
350-FM34
350-FM35
440-=FM5
100-FMI
100-FM2
100-FM3
710
711
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
726
728
731
732
735
736
737
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
75O
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
766
770
771
772
773
777
778
779
783
784
785
786
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
CO2 TRANSDUCER
FAN (ITEM 123A)
PRIMARY H20 TANK ASSY
PRIMARY WATER TANK AS
PRIMARY WATER TANK AS
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
PLSS/SOP TMG
REAL TIME DATA SYSTEM
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
DISPLAY INTENSITY CON
DISPLAY INTENSITY CON
CAUTION AND WARNING
AIRLOCK ADAPTER PLATE
AIRLOCK ADAPTER PLATE
AIRLOCK ADAPTER PLATE
CONTAMINATE CONTROL
CONTAMINANT CONTROL
CONTAMINANT CONTROL
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
COMMON MULTIPLE CONN
FAN/SEPARATOR/PUMP/MO
PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
CAUTION AND WARNING
CAUTION AND WARNING
DCM
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
EEH
PLSS
PLSS
PLSS
CPU FAILURE
ELECTRICAL SHORT
FILTER CLOGS
CONTAMINATION BRE
SLOW RESPONSE
BLADE FRACTURES
LEVER LATCH ASSEM
LEVER LATCH ASSEM
GAS LINES CLOG
BREAKTHROUGH
LOOSE TMG PARTIAL
ELECTRICAL SHORT
ELECTRICAL OPEN
ELECTRICAL SHORT
INTERMITTENT OPER
BROKEN SHAFT
SWITCH FAILS
ADAPTER DETACHES
EMU DETACHES
SCU DETACHES
FAILS TO REMOVE
PRESENCE OF DICHL
OVERHEATING/HYROG
OPEN IN BATT SENS
SHORT IN BATT SEN
02 LEAKAGE
FAILS STUCK
CAM DETACHES
MOUNTING SCREW
REDUCED AIR STREA
POROUS PLATE SPAT
5.6V POWER SUPPLY
TIMELINE MEMORY
SCREW BRACKET DIS
SHORT INPUT
INPUT TO OUTPUT
BATTERY POWER
FAN/PUMP SWITCH
SHORT INPUT
DC/DC CURRENT LIM
SHORT INPUT
NEGATIVE CURRENT
SHORT INPUT
ALL SECONDARY VOL
LCD MICROPROCESSOR
LEAKAGE AT HUT
LOWER BRACKET FRA
H20 MAKEUP TUBE
02 PRESSURE RELIEF
D-If
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
100-FM4
102-FMI5
102-FMI9
105-FM3
105-FM5
105-FM2
108-FMI
103-FM7
103-FM3
103-FMII
103-FMI7
103-FMI8
106-FM9
106-FMII
106-FMI2
104-FMI0
104-FM20
I04-FM23
104-FM30
I04-FM36
I04-FM37
I04-FM35
102-FM8
102-FM9
102-FMII
102-FMI3
102-FMI4
I02-FM28
I03-FM23
104-FM40
106-FMI7
107-FM8
106-FMI9
103-FMI2
103-FMI6
104-FM31
101-FM5
103-FM2A
104-FM2
104-FMI2
104-FMI4
787
8O3
804
8O5
806
807
8O8
809
810
813
814
815
816
817
818
82O
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
844
845
846
848
849
851
852
856
858
862
864
865
866
867
87O
872
873
874
875
PLSS
NECK RING AND VENT
WATER LINE AND VENT
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
HELMET ASSEMBLY
HELMET ASSEMBLY
HELMET ASSEMBLY
EVVA
UPPER/LOWER ARM RESTR
UPPER ARM RESTRAINT
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
ARM BEARING ASSEMBLY
WRIST DISCONNECT
WRIST DISCONNECT
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
BLADDER ASSEMBLY"
WRIST DISCONNECT
WRIST DISCONNECT
WAIST RESTRAINT
WAIST RESTRAINT
WAIST RESTRAINT
WAIST BEARING
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT
BOOT DISCONNECT
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBL
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBL
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBL
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBL
HARD TORSO SHELL
HARD TORSO SHELL
HARD TORSO SHELL
HUT ASSEMBLY
HUT ASSEMBLY
HUT TMG
ARM TMG
WAIST/BRIEF/LTA/BOOT
GLOVE TMG
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
MITTEN ASSEMBLY
ARM BEARING ASSEMBLY
LOWER ARM RESTRAINT A
BOOT DISCONNECT
CCA
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
WAIST BEARING
WAIST BEARING
EMU/MMU LATCH DIS
EXTERNAL LOOP TAP
REDUCED VENT FLOW
TMG LOOP TAPE LO0
MINI WORK STATION
VALSALVA DEVICE D
HELMET FOGGING
VENT PAD DE-BONDS
SHELL CRACKED
TMG LOOSE
AXIAL RESTRAINT
RESTRAINT BRACKET
LOWER PRIMARY RES
PRIMARY RESTRAINT
PRIMARY RESTRAINT
TMG ATTACHMENT
FLOCK DELAMINATES
RESTRAINT BRACKET
TETHER SEVERS
HOLE OR SEPARATION
AXIAL RESTRAINT
TMG LOOSE
TETHER BRACKET LO
HOLE OR SEPARATION
TMG SEPARATION
LOSS OF AXIAL RES
HEEL-TOP RETAININ
RUBBER SOLE ABRAD
HOLE OR TEAR
TMG DISATTACHES
H20 LEAKAGE
VENT RETURN FLOW
GIMBAL PIVOT SOCK
IDB DETACHES
BROKEN GIMBAL TRA
LOOSE OR HAS HOLE
LOOSE OR HAS HOLE
LOOSE OR HAS HOLE
HOLE OR SEPARATION
H20 FLOW RESTRICT
INSULATION TORN
LOWER PRIMARY RES
AXIAL RESTRAINT
LOSS OF AXIAL RES
CHIN STRAP FAILS
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
UPPER PRIMARY EXI
LOSS OF BALL BEAR
D-12
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
104-FMI5
104-FMI6
104-FMI7
104-FMI8
104-FMI9
I04-FM26
I04-FM27
105-FM4
106-FM4
107-FMI
108-FM2
108-FM4
108-FM9
876
877
878
879
88O
881
882
886
887
888
889
890
891
WAIST BEARING
WAIST BEARING
WAIST BEARING
WAIST BEARING
WAIST BEARING
LOWERTORSO RESTRAINT
LOWERTORSORESTRAINT
HELMET ASSEMBLY
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
EXTRAVEHICULARVISOR
EXTRAVEHICULARVISOR
EXTRAVEHICULARVISOR
LOSS OF LOWERPRI
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
LOSS OF REAR REST
TETHER BRACKET FR
LOSS OF HIP JOINT
CROTCHBUCKLE YIE
FRESNEL LENS DETA
GIMBAL RING FRACT
ZIPPER DETACHES
CRACKED/SCRATCHED
EYE SHADES JAMMED
TENSION BAND BREA
D-13

APPENDIX E
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
15, Analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit, (28 November
1986). Prior results were obtained independently and documented
before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental
analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously
considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item
being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of _MEA and
CIL, I0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 701
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
CLIV SWITCH FAILS IN "VALVE OPEN"
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSs
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771887-2
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL ARCING, MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONCURRENT FAILURE OF ITEM 134 CHECK VALVE WHEN MOTOR NOT
OPERATING CAN RESULT IN FLOODING OF FAN SEPARATOR AND MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 702
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
CLIV SWITCH FAILS IN "VALVE CLOSE"
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSs
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA : 2/ 2
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA : 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771887-2
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL ARCING, MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING PRE- AND POST-EVA A FAILED CLOSED VALVE CAN RESULT IN
INABILITY TO PERFORM LCVG CHANING. DURING EVA, A CONCURRENT
FAILURE OF THE 172 CHECK VALVE (WITH A "HARD" CHARGE) CAN RESULT
IN SEPARATOR FLOODING DUE TO INABILITY TO REMOVE CONDESATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 703
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
LOSS OF INPUT POWER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767792-2
C [ P ]
CAUSES: WIRE CHAFFING/SEVERS, CONTACT FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF C&W DISPLAY RESULTS IN MISSION TERMINATION.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 704
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
5V POWER SUPPLY FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) c&w
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: SHORT CIRCUIT, ELECTRONIC VOLTAGE CONTROL CIRCUIT FAILS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REFERENCE VOLTAGE TO A/D CONVERTER RESULTS IN ANALOG-TO-
DIGITAL CONVERSION FUNCTION OF C&W SYSTEM. POSSIBLE FALSE
MESSAGES CAN RESULT. MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO LOSS OF C&W
FUNCTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 705
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
5V REFERENCE SUPPLY FAILS LOW
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) c&w
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA : 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA : 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER : SV785970-5
CAUSES: OPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT, ELECTRONIC VOLTAGE CONTROL
CIRCUIT FAILS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ANALOG-TO-DIGITAL CONVERSION FUNCTION FOR C&W PARAMETERS.
MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 706
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
EMU TIMELINE MEMORY FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) C&W
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS ON MEMORY, BUS FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO SEQUENCE PROGRAMS BETWEEN EMU "STATES".
MISSION.
TERMINATE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMiT
MDAC ID: 707
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
C&W TONE DISCRETE FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) C&W
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: SHORT CIRCUIT, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
C&W TONE GENERATED CONTINUOUSLY CAUSING CREW DISCOMFORT AND
DEPENDENCE UPON DISPLAY FOR C&W. TERMINATE MISSION.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 708
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
C&W TONE DISCRETE FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) c&w
3)
4)
5)
6)
?)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, THERMAL STRESS, BUFFER FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TONE CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON NOT BEING MADE AWARE OF A
PARTICULAR FAILURE (UPON ITS DETECTION BY THE C&W SYSTEM). IF A
SECOND FAILURE (I.E., A SUIT LEAK, HIGH C02, OR FAILED
SUBLIMATOR) SHOULD OCCUR IN CONCERT WITH TONE FAILURE, CREWPERSON
REACTION TIME COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED AND MAY RESULT IN
LOSS OF LIFE. MISSION TERMINATION WOULD OCCUR FOR THE FIRST
FAILURE IF DETECTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 709
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
FAILURE OF PERMANENT MEMORY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) C&W
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: INPUT/OUTPUT FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY OF CWS TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTIONS WITH INTEGRITY.
MISSION TERMINATION WILL RESULT.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 710
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS
CPU FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) c&w
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
e)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES:
SHORT
I/O PORT FAILURE, GATE FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, OPEN,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PERFORM C&W PROCESSING AND CHECKS. MISSION
TERMINATION. IF CPU FAILURE INHIBITS TONE USAGE AND IS COMBINED
WITH A SECOND CRITICAL EMU FAILURE LOSS OF LIFE CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-If
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 711
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
ELECTRICAL SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) c_w
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
e)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, WIRE CHAFFING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ANY POWER SUPPLY OR MAJOR ELECTRONIC FUNCTION CAN SEVERLY
INHIBIT CWS OPERATION. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON
LOSS IF COMBINED WITH A SECOND "CRITICAL" EMU FAILURE DURING EVA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 712
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY REGULATOR (ITEM II3D)
OSCILLATING OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV77873-12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BALANCE STEM MISALIGNED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OSCILLATING OUTPUT WITHIN ACCEPTABLE PRESSURE LIMITS WILL HAVE NO
IMPACT TO MISSION OR CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 713
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H20 REGULATOR (ITEM II3E)
OSCILLATING OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV77873-12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BALANCE STEM MISALIGNED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OSCILLATING OUTPUT WITHIN ACCEPTABLE PRESSURE LIMITS WILL HAVE NO
IMPACT TO MISSION OR IMPACT CREWPERSON SAFETY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 714
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
FILTER CLOGS AT DCM FILL OR END FITTING
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO CHARGE THE PLSS WITH 02. MISSION
TERMINATION WILL RESULT DURING PRE-EVA AND/OR POST-EVA.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 715
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
CONTAMINATION BREAKTHROUGH AT DCM END FITTING
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
CAUSES: FILTER EROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTAMINATON WOULD NORMALLY BE PICKED UP BY 02 MANIFOLD FILTERS;
HOWEVER, IF THESE FILTERS WERE ALSO FAILED CONTAMINATION CAN
RESULT IN FAILURE OF THE 113 REGULATOR AND REQUIRE SOP USAGE TO
RETURN TO VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 716
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CO2 TRANSDUCER (ITEM 122)
SLOW RESPONSE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767798-I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MEMBRANE DOES NOT PASS SAMPLE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT RESULTS FROM THE SENSOR FAILURE; HOWEVER, IF
THE CCC ALSO FALIED, HIGH CO2 LEVEL CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS
THROUGH DISORIENTATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 717
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN (ITEM 123A)
BLADE FRACTURES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) pLss
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: I/1
EVA: i/1
POST-EVA: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787994-8
CAUSES : MATERIAL DEFECT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FRACTURE OF FAN BLADE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VENT LOOP; IF SOP ALSO
FAILS, CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST. ADDITIONALLY, SEINCE THE FAN
BLADES ARE METALLIC, A FAN BLADE STRIKING THE HOUSING CAN RESULT
IN AN OXYGEN FIRE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 02/25/8S E-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 718
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY H20 TANK ASSEMBLY (ITEM 131/162)
LEVER LATCH ASSEMBLY FAILS - BATTERY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /NA
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, LATCH FRACTURE, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LATCH FEATURES TWO LOCKING MECHANISMS FOR THE BATTERY. THE
BATTERY ELECTRICAL CONNECTION AND THE TMG PROVIDE ADDITIONAL
RETENTION CAPABILITY. FAILURE OF ONE LOCK MECHANISM WILL HAVE NO
IMPACT, HOWEVER, FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANT MECHANISMS AND THE
SOP CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 719
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY WATER TANK ASSEMBLY (ITEM 131/162)
LEVER LATCH ASSEMBLY FAILS - CCC
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSs
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, LATCH FRACTURE, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LATCH FEATURES TWO LOCKING MECHANISMS FOR THE CCC. THE CCC
CONNECTIONS AND THE TMG PROVIDE ADDITIONAL RETENTION CAPABILITY.
FAILURE OF ONE LOCK MECHANISM WILL HAVE NO IMPACT,
HOWEVER, FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANT MECHANISMS FOR CCC RETENTION
CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS FROM DEPRESSURIZATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-20
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 720
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY WATER TANK ASSEMBLY (ITEM 131/162)
GAS LINES CLOG
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE KRYTOX OR BLADDERS MOVES AND BLOCKS LINES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BLADDER PRESSUREANT WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
SUPPLY SUBLIMATOR PRESSURIZED FEEDWATER AND TO SUPPLY MAKEUP LCVG
H20/COOLING H20. THIS WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF COOLING FUNCTION
AND MISSION TERMINATION. IF SOP ALSO LOST, CREWPERSON CAN
BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 721
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
BREAKTHROUGH
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV783850-14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SUBLIMATOR RESULTS IN LOSS OF PRIMARY TEMPERATURE CONTROL
TECHNIQUE. MISSION TERMINATION RESULTS; HOWEVER, IF COMBINED
WITH LOSS OF SOP COOLING, CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-22
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 723
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITIVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 146)
VALVE CHATTER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787036-3
CAUSES: SPRING UNSEAT/RESEAT FORCE HIGH
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SUIT PRESSURE WILL BE "JUMPY" DURING DEPRESS DUE TO VALVE CHATTER
BUT WILL NOT RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION OR CREWPERSON INJURY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 724
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESERVE WATER TANK (ITEM 148)
GAS LINES CLOG
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE KRYTOX ON BLADDERS MOVES AND BLOCKS LINES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BLADDER PRESSURANT WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
EMPLOY SUBLIMATOR AND TO SUPPLY MAKEUP H20 FOR LCVG AND COOLING
LOOPS. MISSION TERMINATION. IF SOP ALSO LOST, CREWPERSON CAN BE
LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-24
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 726
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PLSS/SOP TMG (ITEM 161)
LOOSE TMG PARTIALLY EXPOSES PLSS/SOP
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA : 2/ 2
EVA : i/1
POST-EVA : 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER : SV772168-15
CAUSES: SEAM SEPARATION, THREAD/CORD BREAKS, FASTENER OPENS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOT WILL RESULT. IF HEATING RESULTS ON PLSS 02
BOTTLES OR SOP 02 BOTTLES, GAS PRESSURE CAN SIGNIFICANTLY
INCREASE DUE TO NO PRESSURE RELIEF AT THE BOTTLES. POSSIBLE
RUPTURE/EXPLOSION OF OXYGEN TANK(S) CAN CAUSE LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 727
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REAL TIME DATA SYSTEM (ITEM 174)
LOSS OF SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV791230-2
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, POWER LOSS, COMPONENT/SENSOR FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EKG SIGNAL NOT REQUIRED FOR EVA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-26
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 728
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REAL TIME DATA SYSTEM
ELECTRICAL SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITI CALITI ES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA : 2/ 2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA : 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER : SV791230-2
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ELECTRICAL SHORT CAN CAUSE PARTIAL TO TOTAL LOSS OF DC/DC
CONVERTER OR EXCESSIVE CURRENT DRAW. MISSION TERMINATION
RESULTS. IF SOP IS ALSO LOST, CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST.
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 729
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FIRST STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213B)
OSCILLATING OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) EMU
2) Lss
3) sop
4)
5)
6)
"7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BALANCE STEM AND SPRING NOT MATCHED UP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OSCILLATING OUTPUT WITHIN PRESSURE LIMITS WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 730
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SECOND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
OSCILLATING OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) sop
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER : SV778475-13
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISMATCHED PARTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OSCILLATING OUTPUT WITHIN PRESSURE LIMITS WILL HAVE NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 731 FLIGHT: 2/2
ITEM: COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN - BATTERY RECHARGE SENSE LINE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTACT SEVERS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SENSE SIGNAL WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO RECHARGE
BATTERY. MISSION TERMINATION CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-30
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 732
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
ELECTRICAL SHORT - BATTERY RECHARGE SENSE LINE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, CHAFFING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT WILL CAUSE BATTERY DISCHARGE AND WILL RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATON AT PRE-EVA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 733
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
INTERMITTENT OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) Lss
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767784-I
c[P]
CAUSES: CORROSION/CONTAMINATION ON WIPER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EGRADED COMUNICATIONS OPERATION.
FAILED, TERMINATE MISSION.
IF BOTH COMMUNICATIONS SETS ARE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 734
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
SHAFT BREAKS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767784-I
CAUSES: IMPACT, EXCESSIVE FORCE APPLIED TO SHAFT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO CHANGE VOLUME. POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE COMMUNICATIONS
SET. TERMINATE MISSION IF BOTH SETS ARE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 735
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)
INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767785-I
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION ON CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE DISPLAY LOSS. TERMINATE MISSION.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-34
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 736
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)
BROKEN SHAFT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767785-I
CAUSES: IMPACT, EXCESSIVE FORCE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO VERY DISPLAY INTENSITY.
DISPLAY MAY REQUIRE SHADING.
IF ENVIRONMENT IS BRIGHT,
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 737
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
SWITCH FAILS IN CENTER (OFF) POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/2
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSs
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767792-2
c[P]
CAUSES: BEARING BINDS, CAM BINDS, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO EMPLOY PROGRAM OR STATUS FUNCTION.
IN MISSION TERMINATION.
THIS WILL RESULT
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-36
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 738
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUIT PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 311)
LIGHT FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
S)
6)
V)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767706-3
CAUSES: OPEN CIRCUIT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO MISSION IMPACT.
C&W DISPLAY.
CREWPERSON CAN EMPLOY AVAILABLE LIGHTING OR
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 739
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM TMG (ITEM 384)
PARTIALLY EXPOSES DCM
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771987-II
CAUSES: SEAM SEPARATION, THREAD/CORD SEVERS OR COMES UNDONE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "COLD/HOT" SPOTS ON DCM ARE REMOTE FROM CREWPERSON AND HIGH
PRESSURE OXYGEN. ELECTRONICS SHOULD NOT BE AFFECTED DUE TO HEAT
DISTRIBUTION. NO IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-38
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 742
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEATH ASSEMBLY (ITEM 428)
CLOTH TORN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) scu
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771749-3
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, ABRASION, SEAM SEPARATES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACTS SINCE SCU IS NOT IN A SEVERE THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-39
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBS YSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 743
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AIRLOCK ADAPTER PLATE (ITEM 470)
ADAPTER DETACHES FROM WALL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767680-03
CAUSES: MOUNTING BRACKET FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ANY ONE BRACKET WOULD RESULT IN AAP DETACHING. MISSION
TERMINATION. FAILURE MODE WILL MOST LIKELY OCCUR DURING ASCENT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-40
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 744
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AIRLOCK ADAPTER PLATE (ITEM 470)
EMU DETACHES FROM AAP
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767680-03
CAUSES: LATCH MECHANISM FAILS OPEN/FRACTURES, PIN FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF TWO PIN-LATCH MECHANISMS OR ONE OF TWO PIN INSERT
MECHANISMS CAN RESULT IN DETACHMENT DURING ASCENT LOADS. MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 745
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AIRLOCK ADAPTER PLATE (ITEM 470)
SCU DETACHES
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767680-03
CAUSES: SCU LATCH FAILS OPEN/FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SCU DETACHMENT CAN RESULT IN DAMAGE TO SCU, AIRLOCK, AND EMU
DURING ASCENT. MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 746
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTAMINATE CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
FAILS TO REMOVE C02
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) Lss
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792600-00
CAUSES: CHANNELING, EARLY LIFE LIMIT REACHED, MOISTURE
PENETRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CO2 REMOVAL CAPABILITY WILL RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION. IF CONCURRENT C02 SENSOR FAILURE ALSO OCCURS,
CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST.
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-43
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 748
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
OVERHEATING/HYROGEN GENERATION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792600-00
CAUSES: WATER IN LiOH
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEGRADED CO2 REMOVAL CAPABILITY WILL RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION. IF COUPLED WITH A CO2 SENSOR FAILURE CREWPERSON CAN
BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-44
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 749
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR
OPEN IN BATT SENSE LINE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) scu
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771763-3
CAUSES: VIBRATION, WIRE SEVERS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SENSE SIGNAL WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO RECHARGE
BATTERY. MISSION TERMINATION CAN RESULT.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 750
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR
SHORT IN BATT SENSE LINE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) scu
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV771763-3
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT WILL CAUSE BATTERY DISCHARGE DURING IV OPERATION.
APPLICABLE TO EVA.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
NOT
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-46
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 751
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN/SEPARATOR/PUMP/MOTOR ASSEMBLY
02 LEAKAGE TO ELECTRONICS/ROTOR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3 ) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: I/I
EVA: I/1
POST-EVA : i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV787994-8
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE-GALLED, AGE, WEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
02 LEAKAGE INTO ELECTRONICS CAN RESULT IN AN OXYGEN FIRE AND
CREWPERSON LOSS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 752
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR
FAILS STUCK AT NOMINAL PRESSURE VALUE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSs
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767788-2
CAUSES: INTERNAL LINKAGE FAILURE, WIPER STICKS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF ONLY ONE FAILURE, NO IMPACTS WOULD RESULT. HOWEVER, IF
COMBINED WITH A PLSS REGULATOR FAILURE OR A LEAK THE SOP WOULD
NECESSARILY BE USED AND MISSION TERMINATION WOULD RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 753
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
CAM DETACHES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER : SV778540-26
CAUSES: IMPACT, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, JOINT FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FREE MOVEMENT OF THE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY ACTUATION MECHANISM CAN
RESULT IN MOVEMENT OUT OF THE EVA POSITION. WERE THIS TO OCCUR
WITH FAILURES OF REDUNDANT PRESSURE MAINTENENACE FUNCTIONS (E.G.,
A LEAK) THE PLSS AND SOP MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE AND CREWPERSON
COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 754
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
MOUNTING SCREW FRACTURES
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
B [ F ] C [ F ]
CAUSES: IMPACT, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE IOA RECOGNIZES THAT I0 MOUNTING SCREWS EXIST AND SEVEN ARE
REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY. THEREFORE 3 SCREW MUST BE LOST
BEFORE THE SYSTEM AND CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-50
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 755
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
REDUCED AIR STREAM HEAT REMOVAL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) EMU
2) Lss
3) pLss
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV783850-14
CAUSES: CONTAMINANT DEPOSITION ON HEAT EXCHANGER WALLS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HEAT EXCHANGER EFFICIENCY CAN RESULT IN WARMER VENT FLOW
THAN DESIRED. THIS IN TURN DEGRADES THE HUMIDITY CONTROL
FUNCTION AND CAN LEAD TO FOGGING OF THE HELMET AREA AND SOP
OPERATION. MISSION TERMINATION CAN RESULT. IF THE SOP WERE ALSO
FAILED, CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST FROM DISORIENTATION DUE TO HELMET
FOGGING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-51
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 756
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHANGES
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
POROUS PLATE SPATIAL RELATION TO SUBLIMATOR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV783850-14
CAUSES: IMPACT ON POROUS PLATE MOUNTING EDGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DECREASED EFFICIENCY CAN LEAD TO LOSS/DEGRADATION OF HUMIDITY
CONTROL AND COOLING FUNCTIONS. MISSION TERMINATION WILL RESULT
AS WILL SOP OPERATIONS. WERE THE SOP ALSO FAILED, THE CREWPERSON
WOULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-52
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 757
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
5.6V POWER SUPPLY FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) c_w
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: OPEN AT 5.6V INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 5V NON-VOLATILE RAM POWER AND 5V DIGITAL POWER SUED BY
NUMEROUS C&W COMPONENTS THEREBY CAUSING OVERALL C&W LOSS.
MISSION TERMINATION SHOULD RESULT. ADDITIONALLY, WERE A
SIMULTANEOUS CCC FAILURE TO OCCUR, THE CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-53
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 758
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
TIMELINE MEMORY FAILS AT X=I
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) C_W
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
c[P]
CAUSES: INTERNAL MEMORY ADDRESS LATCH FAILS CLOSED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF NUMEROUS EVA CAUTION AND WARNING MONITORING FUNCTIONS
(INCLUDING CO2 LEVELS). MISSION TERMINATION. WERE THE CCC TO
ALSO FAIL, THE CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-54
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 759
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM
SCREW BRACKET DISATTACHES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: IMPACT, STRIPPED SCREW, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT FOR FAILURE OF SINGLE SCREW/BRACKET; HOWEVER, IF ALL
WERE TO FAIL THE DCM COULD DETACH FROM THE HUT AND CAUSE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON DUE TO GROSS EXTERNAL OXYGEN LEAKAGE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-55
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 760
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIMITER
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
SHORT INPUT TO OUTPUT IN PRIMARY EVC CURRENT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITER FUNCTION. NO INPACT UNLESS SUBSEQUENT
FAILURE IN DOWNSTREAM ELECTRONICS (I.E., A SHORT) RESULTS IN
EXCESSIVE CURRENT DRAW UPON THE BATTERY. THIS CAN RESULT IN A
SHORTENED MISSION OR LOSS OF BATTERY POWER. IF BATTERY POWER IS
LOST THE SOP WOULD BE EMPLOYED TO RETURN TO VEHICLE. THEREFORE,
LOSS OF LIFE CAN RESULT IF THE SOP WERE ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-56
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 761
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIMITER
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
INPUT TO OUTPUT SHORT IN FEEDWATER VALVE CURRENT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITER FUNCTION. NO IMPACT UNLESS SUBSEQUENT
FAILURE IN DOWNSTREAM ELECTRONICS (I.E., A SHORT) CAUSES
EXCESSIVE CURRENT DRAW UPON THE BATTERY. THIS CAN RESULT IN A
SHORTENED MISSION OR LOSS OF BATTERY POWER. IF BATTERY POWER IS
LOST,
THE SOP IS REQUIRED FOR RETURN TO VEHICLE; HOWEVER, IF THE SOP
WERE ALSO FAILED, THE CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-57
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 762
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
BATTERY POWER "ON" DISCRETE FAILS OFF
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) Lss
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CONSUMMABLES MANAGEMENT AND MONITORING FUNCTION BY CWS.
WERE A SECOND FAILURE TO RESULT (I.E., AN OXYGEN LEAK), THE
CREWPERSON MAY BE REQUIRED TO EMPLOY THE SOP TO RETURN TO
VEHICLE. IF THE SOP WERE ALSO FAILED THE CREWPERSON COULD BE
LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-58
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 763
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
BATTERY POWER "ON" DISCRETE FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: LIMITED SHORT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS MESSAGE DURING IV OPERATIONS; OTHERWISE, NO IVA OR EVA
IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-59
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 764
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH DISCRETE FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS MESSAGE DISPLAYED AND LOSS OF CWS SUBLIMATOR PRESSURE
MONITORING FOR LIMIT VIOLATIONS. SUBLIMATOR PRESSURE READOUT
REMAINS AVAILABLE. NO MISSION OR CREWPERSON IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-60
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 765
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FEEDWATER VALVE SWTICH DISCRETE FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: LIMITED SHORT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS MESSAGE DURING IVA OPERATONS; OTHERWISE, NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-61
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 766
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAN/PUMP SWITCH DISCRETE FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) Lss
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS DISCRETE CAUSES ERRONEOUS FAN STATUS MESSAGE AND
LOSS OF CWS VENT FLOW MONITORING. WERE VENT FLOW ALSO FAILED
SUCH THAT AN INEFFICIENT ORAL/NASAL FLUSH TO OCCUR, THE
CREWPERSON COULD BE SUBJECTED TO HIGH CO2 LEVELS THAT CAN RESULT
IN
DISORIENTATION AND LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-62
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 767
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAN/PUMP SWITCH DISCRETE FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: SHORT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS MESSAGE GENERATION WHEN FAN IS ACTUALLY OFF.
IMPACTS ON MISSION OR CREWPERSON.
NO
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-63
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 768
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
VEHICLE VOLTAGE DISCRETE FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSs
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS MESSAGE GENERATION DURING IVA; OTHERWISE, NO OTHER
IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-64
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 769
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
VEHICLE VOLTAGE DISCRETE FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) Lss
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: SHORT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CWS MONITORING FOR HIGH AXYGEN USE RATE AND H20 OFF
STATUS DURING EVA. SHOULD AN OXYGEN ALSO OCCUR DURING EVA THE
CREWPERSON WOULD NOT BE ALERTED (EXCEPT BY THE CONSUMMABLES
MANAGEMENT FUNCTION WHICH WOULD INDICATE ONLY 30 MINUTES OXYGEN
LEFT;
HOWEVER, THIS TIME COULD BE ERRONEOUS DUE TO THE MANNER OF THE
CWS CALCULATION). THIS CAN RESULT IN SOP USAGE WHICH IF ALSO
FAILED CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-65
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 770
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
SHORT INPUT TO OUTPUT IN CLIV CURRENT LIMITER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITER FUNCTION RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF ALL
POWER SHOULD A SUBSEQUENTDOWNSTREAM SHORT OCCUR. IF THE SOP IS
ALSO FAILED WITH LOSS OF POWER, THE CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-66
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 771
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
DC/DC CURRENT LIMITER FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL CYCLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DC/DC CONVERTER SUPPORTED ELECTRONICS - CWS, SENSORS, AND
RTDS. MISSION TERMINATION. WERE A CO2 CONTROL FUNCTION FAILURE
TO ALSO OCCUR, THE CREWPERSON COULD BECOME DISORIENTED AND UNABLE
TO REACT PROPERLY, THEREBY CAUSING LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-67
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 772
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIMITER
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
SHORT INPUT TO OUTPUT FOR DC/DC CONVERTER CURRENT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITER FUNCTION. IF ACCOMPANIED BY A DOWNSTREAM
SHORT THE BATTERY COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY DRAWN DOWN SUCH THAT
PLSS FUNCTIONS COULD NOT BE SATISFIED AND THE SOP REQUIRED. AN
ADDITIONAL SOP FAILURE COULD THEN RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-68
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 773
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
NEGATIVE CURRENT RETURN LINE FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: VIBRATION, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CIRCUIT AND, THEREFORE, ALL EMU POWER. MISSION
TERMINATION. IF THE SOP WERE ALSO FAILED, THE CREWPERSON WOULD
BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-69
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 774
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
MOTOR TACH SIGNAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MOTOR TACHAMETER SENSING.
CREWPERSON.
NO IMPACTS TO MISSION OR
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-70
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 775
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
TEMPORARY DROP IN DC/DC CONVERTER VOLTAGES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /
EVA: /
POST-EVA: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT A FAILURE - THIS IS AN ANOMALY.
HDW/FUNC
/
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-71
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 776
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
RADIATED EMISSIONS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2) _s
3 ) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /
EVA: /
POST-EVA: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
c [
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHOULD BE COVERED AS A HAZARD ANALYSIS.
HDW/FUNC
/
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-72
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 777
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIMITER
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
SHORT INPUT TO OUTPUT OF SECONDARY EVC CURRENT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) Lss
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITER FUNCTION CAN RESULT IN COMPLETE EMU POWER
LOSS IF ACCOMPANIED BY DOWNSTREAM SHORT. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON
LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS IN THIS SCENARIO.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-73
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 778
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
ALL SECONDARY VOLTAGES DRIFT HIGH
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: ELECTRONIC FAILURE IN FEEDBACK GENERATOR OR MODULATOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH VOLTAGE SUPPLIED TO "LOW VOLTAGE" ELECTRONICS CAN RESULT IN
FAILURE OF THESE ITEMS. IF A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF CO2 CONTROL
FUNCTION OCCURS, THE CREWPERSON COULD BECOME DISORIENTED AND
POSSIBLY LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-74
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 779
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LCD MICROPROCESSOR FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LCD DISPLAY WILL RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION. THIS
WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE TONES AND ACTUAL MONITORING OF VALUES
BY THE CWS; HOWEVER, IF A CONCURRENT CO2 CONTROL FAILURE OR LOW
VENT FLOW FAILURE WERE TO OCCUR, THE CREWPERSON WOULD BE
ALERTED BUT NOT INFORMED OF THE PROPER CORRECTIVE ACTION.
THEREFORE, THE CREWMEMBER CAN BE SUBJECTED TO HIGH CO2 AND
DISORIENTATION PRIOR TO RETURN TO VEHICLE. DISORIENTATION CAN
RESULT IN LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-75
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 780
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DISPLAY (ITEM 351)
DISPLAY FAILS ON
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) Lss
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART }Fu'MBER: SV 792526-1
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, CLOCK FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DISPLAY OUTPUT WILL NOT CHANGE OR BLANK. THIS IS THE SAME
"EFFECT" AS LOSS OF DISPLAY. IF A CONCURRENT CO2 CONTROL FAILURE
WERE TO ALSO OCCUR, THE CREWPERSON WOULD NOT BE ALERTED TO THE
PROPER CORRECTIVE ACTION ALTHOUGH THE TONE WILL OCCUR. THIS CAN
RESULT IN CREWPERSON DISORIENTATION AND LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-76
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 781
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DISPLAY (ITEM 351)
BACKLIGHTING FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV 792526-1
CAUSES: SHORT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT. (POWER USAGE IS INSIGNIFICANT).
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-77
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 782
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DISPLAY (ITEM 351)
BACKLIGHTING FAILS OFF
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSs
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV 792526-1
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS WILL NOT INHIBIT USE OF THE DISPLAY; THEREFORE, NO IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-78
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 783
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EEH
LEAKAGE AT HUT FEEDTHROUGH
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) Lss
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OXYGEN SUPPLY REQUIRES SOP USAGE TO RETURN TO VEHICLE.
POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-79
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 784
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PLSS
LOWER BRACKET FRACTURED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2) Lss
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV 789200
CAUSES: IMPACT, MATERIAL FATIGUE/DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LOWER BRACKET (ONE OF TWO) CAN RESULT IN SEPARATION OF
HUT AND PLSS IF SECOND BRACKET ALSO LOST. IF SECOND BRACKET IS
ALSO LOST AND SEPARATION WERE TO OCCUR EVA, CREWPERSON WOULD BE
LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-80
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 785
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PLSS
H20 MAKEUP TUBE-EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV 789200
CAUSES: IMPACT, SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FEEDWATER SUPPLY CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF HUMIDITY CONTROL.
IF SOP ALSO LOST, CREWPERSON WILL BE LOST DUE TO NO DEFOG
CAPABILITY FOR HELMET.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE o2/2s/88 E-81
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 786
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PLSS
02 PRESSURE RELIEF TUBE - EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV 789200
CAUSES: IMPACT, SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN SUPPLY RESULTS IN SOP USAGE.
FAILED, THE CREWPERSON WOULD BE LOST.
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
IF SOP IS
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-82
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 787
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PLSS
EMU/MMU LATCH DISCONNECTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV789200
CAUSES: IMPACT, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, SCREW(S) SHEAR,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE LATCH OF SECURE THE EMU TO THE MMU WILL RESULT IN
DEPENDENCY UPON THE RETENTION BELT (OTHER LATCH ALONE IS
INSUFFICIENT). IF THE RETENTION BELT WERE TO FAIL DURING EMU-MMU
OPERATIONS, THE CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST DUE TO SEPARATION FROM
THE MMU.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-83
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 801
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
INTERNAL LEAKAGE OF HELMET INLET DUCT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9357-10/9713-03
CAUSES: SEAL WEAR OR DETERIORATION, CONTAMINATION ON SEAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MINIMAL LOSS OF VENT FLOW TO HELMET SHOULD NOT HAVE MISSION OR
CREW IMPACT. CAN RESULT IN MINOR LOSS OF SOP OXYGEN DURING SOP
CHECK BUT SHOULD ALSO NOT BE A SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY TO HAVE
NEGATIVE IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-84
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 802
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MISSING
NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
INTERNAL LOOP TAPE CLIP ATTACHMENT SCREW LOOSE OR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9357-10/9713-03
CAUSES: SCREW DEFECTIVE, INEFFECTIVE THREADLOCK, CORROSION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON THE BRACKET; HOWEVER, A LOOSE SCREW WITH THE SSA
(DURING AN EVA) CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT, ABRATION OF
WATER LINES ON THE LCVG (SUCH THAT A LEAK CAN OCCUR), OR SUIT
BLADDER ABRASION. SUCH AN EFFECT CAN RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION. ALSO IF ALL THE SCREWS FAILED, BRACKET LOSS OF
FUNCTION SHOULD HAVE NO MORE SEVERE AN EFFECT THAN THE LOOSE
SCREW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-85
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 803
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OR MISSING
NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
EXTERNAL LOOP TAPE BRACKET ATTACHING SCREW LOOSE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9357-10/9713-03
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE SCREW, INEFFECTIVE THREADLOCK, CORROSION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SCREW SHOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON BRACKET; HOWEVER, LOSS
OF ALL SCREWS AND THEREFORE BRACKET FUNCTION CAN RESULT IN
UNRESTRAINED TMG GARMENT WHICH IN TURN CAN CAUSE POSSIBLE "HOT"
OR "COLD" SPOTS. MISSION TERMINATION WOULD THEN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 804
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER LINE AND VENT TUBE ASSEMBLY
REDUCED VENT FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 0102-82437-18
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PARTIAL BLOCKAGE OF VENT TUBE REDUCES FLOW. MISSION TERMINATION
RESULTS. IF SIGNIFICANT FLOW REDUCTION OCCURS AND THE SOP IS
ALSO FAILED, CREWMEMBER LOSS CAN ALSO OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 805
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (HUT HALF)
TMG LOOP TAPE LOOSE OR BROKEN
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9786-05
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MATERIALS DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL HOT OR COLD SOPTS CAN RESULT. DEPENDENT UPON THE
ENVIRONMENT, THIS CAN PRESENT THE CREWPERSON WITH SIGNIFICANT
DISCOMFORT OVER TIME; THEREFORE, MISSION TERMINATION CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-88
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 806
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
MINI WORK STATION WILL NOT ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9786-05
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION IN MORENTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO EMPLOY MINI WORK STATION MAY RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-89
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 807
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HELMET ASSEMBLY
VALSALVA DEVICE DISCONNECTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) HELMET
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9672-01
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE ADHESIVE, IMPACT BY CREWPERSON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECTS EXCEPT FOR POSSIBLE CREW DISCOMFORT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-90
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 808
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HELMET ASSEMBLY
HELMET FOGGING (NOT DUE TO SYSTEM FAILURE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) HELMET
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9672-01
CAUSES: IMPROPER APPLICATION OF ANTI FOG FILM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOGGING CAN IMPAIR VISION AND PERFORMANCE OF EVA TASKS. TERMINATE
MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-91
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 809
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HELMET ASSEMBLY
VENT PAD DE-BONDS FROM HELMET
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) HELMET
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9672-01
CAUSES: OLD OR DEFECTIVE BONDING AGENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEGRADATION OF ORAL-NASAL FLUSH CAN RESULT IN HELMET FOGGING AND
CO2 BUILDUP. USE OF HELMET CPV AND/OR DCM PURGE VALVE AND SOP
MAY BE REQUIRED, BUT IF THESE TOO ARE FAILED, CREWPERSON CAN BE
LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-92
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 810
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVVA
SHELL CRACKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HELMET
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EVVA VISOR MOVEMENT CAN BE IMPAIRED AS COULD THE CAPABILITY TO
MOUNT THE LIGHTS. THIS CAN RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-93
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 811
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVVA
CRACKED/FRACTURED EYE SHADES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) HELMET
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER : A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: IMPACT, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE UNLESS VISORS ARE ALSO FAILED THEN MISSION WOULD BE
TERMINATED.
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-94
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 812
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EWA
BRACKET LOOSE FOR LIGHTS OR BATTERY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: IMPACT, DEFECTIVE THREADLOCK, SCREW FRACTURES, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF THREE BRACKETS SHOULD NOT RESULT IN IMPACT;
HOWEVER, LOSS OF ONE MORE CAN RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-95
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 813
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UPPER/LOWER ARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
TMG LOOSE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0103-82318-22/0103-82351-16
CAUSES:
BREAKS
LOOP TAPE DEFECTIVE/TORN, VELCRO DEFECTIVE, THREAD/CORD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE LOCALIZED HOT OR COLD SPOTS CAN RESULT ARM ASSEMBLY. IF
ENVIRONMENT IS SEVERE, THESE SPOTS CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON
DISCOMFORT SUFFICIENT ENOUGH FOR MISSION IMPACT OR TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-96
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 814
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/XR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MOVES
UPPER ARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
AXIAL RESTRAINT SEAM SEPARATION OR SIZING INSERT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
X) EMU
2 ) SSA
3 ) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0103-82318-22
CAUSES: FABRIC DEFECT, DEFECTIVE THREAD OR CORD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLADDER IS STILL UNDER TMG AND CAN ACCEPT OPERATING SUIT
PRESSURES BUT IS SUBJECT TO ABRASION AND WEAR. IF BLADDER WERE
TO ALSO FAIL, CREWPERSON LOSS CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-97
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 815
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
RESTRAINT BRACKET SCREW LOOSE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9782-04
CAUSES: IMPACT, VIBRATION, DEFECTIVE THREADLOCK OR SCREW
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT FOR LOSS OF 1 OF 4 SCREWS. BUT IF ONE MORE IS LOST
ASSEMBLY COULD SEPARATE AND CREWMEMBER COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-98
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 816
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARM BEARING ASSEMBLY
LOWER PRIMARY RESTRAINT BRACKET BROKEN/FAILED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9657-06
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, IMPACT, KEEPER SCREW BACKED OUT,
DEFECTIVE THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL LOAD RESTRAINT INTEGRITY. IF COMBINED WITH
LOSS OF SECONDARY RESTRAINT OR COMPLETE LOSS OF ATTACHMENT
SCREWS, CREWMEMBER COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-99
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 817
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WRIST DISCONNECT
PRIMARY RESTRAINT BRACKET BROKEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-02, A/L 9814-02
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE IMPACT DUE TO BLADDER FABRIC BEING SECONDARY
RESTRAINT; HOWEVER, FAILURE OF SECONDARY RESTRAINT CAN RESULT IN
GROSS OXYGEN LOSS AND LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-100
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 818
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WRIST DISCONNECT
PRIMARY RESTRAINT BRACKET LOOSE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-02, A/L 9814-02
CAUSES: SCREW FRACTURES OR BACKS OUT, VIBRATION, DEFECTIVE
THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOOSE BRACKET HAS NO IMPACT UNLESS REMAINING SCREWS AND SECONDARY
RESTRAINT ALSO LOST THEREBY CAUSING GROSS LOSS OF PRESSURE AND
CREWPERSON LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-101
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 819
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
CREWPERSON NERVE COMPRESSION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /
EVA: /
POST-EVA: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-85894-Ii/12
CAUSES: POOR SIZING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW DISCOMFORT CAN RESULT BUT THIS FAILURE CAN ONLY RESULT FROM
PROCEDURAL OR GROUND OPERATION/PROCESSING ERRORS. THEREFORE,
THIS IS MORE SUITED TO A HAZARD ANALYSIS OR AN ANALYSIS OF GSE
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-102
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 820
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
TMG ATTACHMENT FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-85894-11/12
CAUSES:
OR CORD
DEFECTIVE LOOP TAPE, DEFECTIVE CORD, WEAR ON LOOP TAPE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOCALIZED HOT/COLD SPOTS WHICH, DEPENDENT UPON THE
ENVIRONMENT, CAN RESULT IN VARYING LEVELS OF CREWPERSON
DISCOMFORT. IF ENVIRONMENT IS SEVERE AND CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT
SIGNIFICANT, MISSION CAN BE TERMINATED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-103
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 821
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLADDER ASSEMBLY
FLOCK DELAMINATES FROM BLADDER
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) EMU
2 ) SSA
3 ) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-87543-01/02
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE ADHESIVE, WEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FLOCK CAN ENTER THE VENT SYSTEM. IF SIGNIFICANT FLOCK AMOUNT
CAN TRANSLATE TO AND CONSTRICT FLOW TO THE CCC, THE CREWPERSON
WOULD HAVE TO EMPLOY THE SOP AND TERMINATE THE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-104
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 822
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WRIST DISCONNECT (GLOVE SIDE)
RESTRAINT BRACKET BROKEN OR LOOSE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9924-01
CAUSES: IMPACT, VIBRATION, SCREW FRACTURE, DEFECTIVE THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE FOR FIRST FAILURE; HOWEVER, IF REMAINING BRACKET SCREWS FAIL
OR LOSS OF SECONDARY RESTRAINT ALSO OCCURS CREWPERSON CAN BE
LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-105
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 823
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WRIST DISCONNECT (GLOVE SIDE)
TETHER SEVERS OR DISATTACHES
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9924-01
S [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, ABRASION, BRACKET FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TETHER FALURE HAS NO CREWPERSON IMPACT BUT CAN RESULT IN
MISSION TERMINATION IF ITEM(S) TETHERED ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE
MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-106
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 824
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
HOLE OR SEPARATION IN RESTRAINT FABRIC
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82347-I07/0104-84811-05
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL OR THREAD, SEAM SEPARATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLADDER FABRIC ASSUMES LOAD; HOWEVER, IF BLADDER FAILS CREWPERSON
CAN BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-107
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 825
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
AXIAL RESTRAINT DISATTACHES FROM CLOTH
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
Z) EMU
2 ) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82347-i07/0104-84811-05
CAUSES: THREAD BREAKS OR DEFECTIVE, FABRIC DEFECTIVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AXIAL RESTRAINT CAUSES THE WAIST SECTION TO DISFORM AND
RESULTS IN THE CREWPERSON HAVING TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT EXERTION
TO OVERCOME THE DISFORMATION OF THE WAIST AREA. MISSION IMPACT
AND TERMINATION CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-108
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 826
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
TMG LOOSE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82347-107/0104-84811-05
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE/WORN THREAD, DEFECTIVE FABRIC
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS WHICH CAN CAUSE CREWPERSON
DISCOMFORT. IF ENVIRONMENT IS SEVERE AND CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT
SIGNIFICANT, MISSION WOULD BE TERMINATED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-109
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 827
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST BEARING
TETHER BRACKET LOOSE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: FRACTURED OR LOOSE SCREW, DEFECTIVE THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 4 SCREWS RESULTS IN LOOSE TETHER BRACKET WITH NO
IMMEDIATE IMPACT. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ONE MORE SCREW CAN RESULT IN
LOSS OF BRACKET AND CREWPERSON BEING UNRESTRAINED TO ORBITER.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-II0
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 828
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT/BLADDER ASSEMBLY
HOLE OR SEPARATION IN RESTRAINT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1) EMU
2 ) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82335-22
CAUSES: FABRIC/THREAD DEFECTIVE, WEAR OR TEAR, SEAM SEPARATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLADDER UNPROTECTED BY RESTRAINT MATERIAL WILL ASSUME SUIT LOADS;
HOWEVER, IF BLADDER ALSO FAILS, CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-Ill
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 829
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT/BLADDER ASSEMBLY
TMG SEPARATION FROM ASSEMBLY
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82335-22
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE/TORN LOOP TAPE, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS CAN CAUSE CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT. IF THE
ENVIRONMENT IS SEVERE ENOUGH, CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT CAN BE
SIGNIFICANT AND RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-II2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 830
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BOOT DISCONNECT
LOSS OF AXIAL RESTRAINT (PRIMARY OR SECONDARY)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9752-01
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, SCREW BACKS OUT, INEFFECTIVE
THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SUIT LOADS WILL BE ASSUMED BY REMAINING RESTRAINT WHICH, IF ALSO
FAILED, CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS DUE TO INABILITY OF SUIT TO
WITHSTAND LOADS AT BOOT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-f13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 831
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBLY
HEEL-TOP RETAINING SCREW LOOSE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82403-29/30
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE THREADLOCK, VIBRATION, SCREW
FRACTURED/STRIPPED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MAY CAUSE DIFFICULTY IN USING FOOT RESTRAINT NECESSARY FOR
MISSION SUCCESS. TERMINATE MISSION.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-II4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 832
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBLY
RUBBER SOLE ABRADED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82403-29/30
CAUSES: WEAR, DEFECTIVE MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS ON SOLE OF BOOT ASSEMBLY. MAY
ALSO CREATE DIFFICULTY IN USING FOOT RESTRAINT(S). IF CREW
DISCOMFORT IS SIGNIFICANT OR UNABLE TO EMPLOY FOOT RESTRAINT,
TERMINATE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-If5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 833
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBLY
HOLE OR TEAR IN RESTRAINT FABRIC
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82403-29/30
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, DEFECTIVE/TORN THREAD/CORD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLADDER WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO LOADS AND WEAR DUE TO LOSS OF
COVERING RESTRAINT FABRIC. IF BLADDER ALSO FAILS, CREWPERSON CAN
BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-II6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 834
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBLY
TMG DISATTACHES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82403-29/30
CAUSES: LOOP TAPE DEFECTIVE/TORN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS CAN CAUSE CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT.
ALSO, LOOSE TMG CAN CAUSE DIFFICULTY IN USING FOOT RESTRAINTS.
IF DISCOMFORT IS SIGNIFICANT OR FOOT RESTRAINTS CANNOT BE USED,
TERMINATE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-II7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 835
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BOOT SIZING INSERT
FOAM SEPARATES FROM INSERT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82664-17/18
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE VELCRO
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO MISSION OR CREWPERSON IMPACTS.
DIFFICULT.
CAN MAKE DONNING MORE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-II8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 836
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
VENT TUNNEL DETACHES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) LCVG
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-82968-07
CAUSES: THREAD TEARS OR DEFECTIVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAN PROVIDE MINIMAL CREW DISCOMFORT BUT WHEN CONNECTED AND SUIT
IS DONNED NO IMPACTS ARE ENVISIONED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-If9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 837
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VENT MANIFOLD AND DUCTS
THRUMB LOOP BROKEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) LCVG
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-811060-08/82568-09/81057-19/20
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT OR TEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INCREASES DONNING DIFFICULTY, OTHERWISE NO IMPACT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-120
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 838
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VENT MANIFOLD AND DUCTS
BOOT ATTACHMENT LOOSE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LCVG
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-811060-08/82568-09/81057-19/20
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT OR TORN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BOOT BECOMES LOOSE AND MAY BE DIFFICULT DONNING OR DOFFING,
OTHERWISE NO IMPACTS.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-121
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 839
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (LCVG HALF)
OXYGEN LEAKAGE IN VENT LOOP
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LCVG
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9693-03/9697-04
CAUSES: SEAL CUT OR DEFECTIVE, LOOSE HOSE CLAMP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF SUIT ATMOSPHERE INTO VENT LOOP AT CONNECTOR MAY RESULT
IN MINIMAL DEGRADATION OF VENT LOOP FLOW THROUGHOUT THE LCVG BUT
WITHOUT A SIGNIFICANT FAILURE (I.E., DISCONNECTION) THE LEAK
SHOULD NOT RESULT IN A MISSION OR CREWMEMBER IMPACT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-122
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 840
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CCA
EARPHONES LOOSE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3)
4)
s)
_)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0101-80001-02
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE/BROKEN THREAD, FASTENER FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE LOOSE EARPHONE WILL NOT RESULT IN AN IMPACT; HOWEVER, IF BOTH
ARE LOOSE, MISSION TERMINATION RESULTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-123
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 841
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CCA
SNAP FAILS CLOSED
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) SSA
2 ) CCA
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0101-80001-02
CAUSES: SNAP WORN OR BENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIFFICULTY IN DOFFING CAN RESULT BUT, OTHERWISE, NO IMPACTS TO
MISSION OR CREWPERSON SAFETY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-124
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 842
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CCA
MICROPHONEBOOMSHIFTS OUT OF RANGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0101-80001-02
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE OR WORN FASTENER, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE MICROPHONE PRESENTS NO IMPACTS DUE TO AVAILABILITY OF
SECOND MICROPHONE. IF BOTH ARE LOST, TERMINATE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-125
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 843
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HARD TORSO SHELL
02 LINE LEAKAGE TO SSA
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772375-21
CAUSES: TUBE PUNCTURED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
02 LEAKAGE TO SSA WILL NOT SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE FLOW TO HELMET;
THEREFORE, NO MISSION OR CREWPERSON IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-126
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 844
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HARD TORSO SHELL
H20 LEAKAGE INTO SSA
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772375-21
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, TUBE PUNCTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GRADUAL LOSS OF H20 SUPPLY AND THEREFORE COOLING CAPABILITY.
FREE WATER IN SUIT CAN GET INTO VENT LOOP AND CAUSE FAILURE OF
CCC. MISSION TERMINATION. IF SOP ALSO LOST OR PURGE VALVES
BLOCKED BY ICE, CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-127
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 845
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HARD TORSO SHELL
VENT RETURN FLOW PARTIALLY OR TOTALLY BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER : SV772375-21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, HAIR, FLOCK, LINT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOW VENT FLOW WILL REQUIRE MISSION TERMINATION AND POSSIBLE SOP
USAGE. IF SOP ALSO FAILS, CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-128
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 846
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HARD TORSO SHELL
GIMBAL PIVOT SOCKET FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: i/i
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772375-21
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, DEFECTIVE BOND, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BELLOWS CAN SEPARATE FROM HUT WITH GIMBAL PIVOT SOCKET FAILURE
AND CAUSE UNCONTROLLABLE DEPRESSURIZATION. LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-129
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 847
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HARD TORSO SHELL
EEH BRACKET LOOSE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA : 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA : 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772375-21
CAUSES : DEFECTIVE BOND, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE DISCOMFORT DURING DONNING/DOFFING.
CREWPERSON IMPACTS.
NO MISSION OR
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-130
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 848
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HUT ASSEMBLY
IDB DETACHES OR FOOD BAR DETACHES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0102-80002-105
CAUSES: VELCRO ADHESIVE DEFECTIVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A DISLODGED IDB OR FOOD BAR CAN POSITION ITSELF IN MANNER WHICH
CAUSES THE CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT OR WHICH INHIBITS OPTIMUM
CREWPERSON PERFORMANCE. MISSION TERMINATION CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-131
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 849
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HUT ASSEMBLY
BROKEN GIMBAL TRAVEL STOP STRAP
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2 ) SSA
3) HUT
4)
5)
_)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 1/1
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0102-80002-105
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, ABRASION, CLAMP SCREWS MISSING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STRAP FALURE WILL CAUSE UNNECESSARY LOADING OF BELLOWS AT TRAVEL
EXTREMES. AXIAL PEELING OF BELLOWS CAN RESULT IN GROSS
DEPRESSURZATION. CREWPERSON LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-132
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 851
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HUT TMG
LOOSE OR HAS HOLE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0102-82782-32
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL OR LOOP TAPE, SEAM SEPARATION, TEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS CAN POSSIBLY CAUSE SIGNIFICANT CREWPERSON
DISCOMFORT. POSSIBLE MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-133
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 852
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUN C
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARM TMG
LOOSE OR HAS HOLE IN IT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
_)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0103-82405-10/0103-82406-07
CAUSES: MATERIAL/LOOP TAPE DEFECT, SEAM SEPARATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS CAN CAUSE CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT. IF
SIGNIFICANT DISCOMFORT RESULTS, CREWPERSON MAY TERMINATE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-134
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 853
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOFFING LEVER SUBASSEMBLY
TORSION SPRING BREAKS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 23869
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LEVERAGE IN UNLATCHING BODY SEAL CLOSURE. THIS IS AN
OPTIONAL ITEM AND ITS FAILURE WOULD BE AN IMPACT ONLY IF THE BODY
SEAL CLOSURE WERE DIFFICULT IN OPERATION. IF BOTH WERE FAILED
MISSION TERMINATION WOULD RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-135
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 854
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DONNING AID HANDLES
LATCH FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /NA
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9857/9858
c[P]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/DEFORMATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INADVERTENT RELEASE OF HANDLES FROM BRACKET INCREASES DONNING
DIFFICULTY ONLY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-136
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 855
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DONNING AID HANDLES
HANDLES WILL NOT INSTALL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /NA
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9857/9858
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFORMATION, IMPACT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DONNING DIFFICULTY IS INCREASED. NO OTHER IMPACTS.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-137
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 856
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST/BRIEF/LTA/BOOT TMG
LOOSE OR HAS HOLE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL/THREAD, SEAM SEPARATION, TEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS CAN CAUSE CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT.
DISCOMFORT IS SIGNIFICANT, MISSION WOULD BE TERMINATED.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
IF
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-138
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 857
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMFORT GLOVE
DAMAGED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-84906-03/04
CAUSES: TEAR, SEAM SEPARATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A CREW OPTION ITEM AND ITS FAILURE WILL HAVE NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-139
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 858
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GLOVE TMG
HOLE OR SEPARATION IN TMG
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-88074-01/02
CAUSES: WEAR, MATERIAL/THREAD DEFECT, TEAR, DEFECTIVE VELCRO
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS WHICH CAN CAUSE CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT.
DISCOMFORT IS SIGNIFICANT, MISSION TERMINATION CAN RESULT.
IF
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-140
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 859
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GLOVE TMG
TMG DETACHES FROM RESTRAINT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-88074-01/02
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL/LOOPTAPE/THREAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS WILL ONLY RESULT IN SOME EXCESS TMG MOVEMENT WHICH SHOULD
NOT REDUCE GLOVE FUNCTION OR IMPACT SAFETY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-141
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 860
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GLOVE TMG
FINGER TIPS LOOSE OR ABRADED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-88074-01/02
CAUSES: CONTACT WITH SHARP OBJECT, DEFECTIVE MATERIAL/BOND
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FALURE MAY SLIGHTLY INCREASE DIFFICULTY OF EVA ACTIVITIES
WHICH EMPLOY "FINGER-TIP" ACTIVITIES (I.E., SWITCH MOVEMENTS) BUT
SHOULD NOT IMPACT MISSION OR SAFETY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-142
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 861
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
BIO-POCKET/POSIMETER DETACHES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LCVG
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-82968-07
CAUSES: MATERIAL/THREAD DEFECT/TEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOCATION OF THESE ITEMS SHOULD INHIBIT THEIR TRANSLATION TO
OTHER AREAS IN SSA. NO IMPACT IS DETECTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-143
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 862
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
H20 FLOW RESTRICTED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LCVG
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-82968
CAUSES: IMPACT CAUSES KINK IN LINE; MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE DEGRADATION IN COOLING CAPABILITY. TERMINATE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-144
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 863
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVVA TMG
HOLE OR SEPARATION IN MATERIAL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) HELMET
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0108-84032-01
CAUSES: MATERIAL/THREAD DEFECT, SEAM SEPARATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS SHOULD NOT CAUSE SIGNIFICANT CREW
DISCOMFORT; THEREFORE, NO IMPACTS.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-145
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 864
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MITTEN ASSEMBLY
INSULATION TORN OR SEPARATED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
s)
_)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THREAD/MATERIAL DEFECT/TEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL HOT SPOT CAN CAUSE DISCOMFORT. ASSUMING REQUIRED FOR
MISSION SUCCESS IF UNABLE TO EMPLOY MISSION, MISSION TERMINATION
RESULTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-146
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 865
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARM BEARING ASSEMBLY
LOWER PRIMARY RESTRAINT BRACKET BROKEN/FAILED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9657-06
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, IMPACT, KEEPER SCREW BACKED OUT,
DEFECTIVE THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL LOAD RESTRAINT INTEGRITY. IF COMBINED WITH
LOSS OF SECONDARY RESTRAINT OR COMPLETE LOSS OF ATTACHMENT
SCREWS, CREWMEMBER COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-147
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 866
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MOVES
LOWER ARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
AXIAL RESTRAINT SEAM SEPARATION OR SIZING INSERT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0103-82351-16
CAUSES: FABRIC DEFECT, DEFECTIVE THREAD OR CORD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLADDER IS STILL UNDER TMG AND CAN ACCEPT OPERATING SUIT
PRESSURES BUT IS SUBJECT TO ABRASION AND WEAR. IF BLADDER WERE
TO ALSO FAIL, CREWPERSON LOSS CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-148
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 867
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BOOT DISCONNECT
LOSS OF AXIAL RESTRAINT (PRIMARY OR SECONDARY)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE- EVA: 2/ 2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9752-01
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, SCREW BACKS OUT, INEFFECTIVE
THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SUIT LOADS WILL BE ASSUMED BY REMAINING RESTRAINT WHICH, IF ALSO
FAILED, CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS DUE TO INABILITY TO SUIT TO
WITHSTAND LOADS AT BOOT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-149
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 868
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CCA
LOSS OF ATTACHMENT EAR SEAL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2 ) SSSA
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, WEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREWPERSON DOES NOT LOSE EAR COMMUNICATIONS BUT DOES GET
INCREASED NOISE. NO IMPACTS.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-150
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 869
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CCA
LOSS OF ABSORPTION ATTACHMENT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2) SSA
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, WEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACTS TO COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY, MISSION OR CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-151
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 870
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
CCA
CHIN STRAP FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/WEAR, MECHANICAL FAILURE OF SNAP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CAN RESULT IN THE ENTIRE CCA SHIFTING SUCH THAT
COMMUNICATOINS IN EITHER DIRECTION IS IMPACTED.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-152
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 871
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
SEPARATION OF BEARING RACES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 1/1
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9782-04
CAUSES: MATERIAL FATIGUE, IMPACT, MATERIAL DEFECT/FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SEPARATION OF ARM FROM SSA CAN RESULT WITH UNCONTROLLABLE EMU
DEPRESSURIZATION. LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-153
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 872
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT BRACKET SWIVEL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER :
CAUSES : MATERIAL FATIGUE/WEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRIMARY LOAD BEARING CAPABILITY WOULD BE LOST. MISSION
TERMINATION RESULTS. IF SECONDARY FUNCTION ALSO LOST, ARM
SEPARATION WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-154
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 873
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (LTA SIDE)
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT BRACKET
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]° C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9787-05
CAUSES: LOOSE OR MISSING SCREWS, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY RESTRAINT LOAD BEARING CAPABILITY WILL RESULT IN
MISSION TERMINATION. IF THE REDUNDANT RESTRAINT ALSO FAILS, THE
CREWPERSON WILL BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-155
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 874
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST BEARING
UPPER PRIMARY EXIAL RESTRAINT BRACKET FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: LOOSE OR MISSING SCREWS, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE,
IMPACT, INEFFECTIVE THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY LOAD BEARING CAPABILITY SHOULD RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION. IF SECONDARY RESTRAINT ALSO FAILS, GROSS LOSS OF
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WILL RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-156
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 875
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST BEARING
LOSS OF BALL BEARING RETAINER SCREW
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2 ) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: STRIPPED/FRACTURED SCREW, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SCREW WILL NOT IMPACT CREWPERSON BUT LOSS OF SECOND
SCREW CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF BALL BEARING RETAINER AND THE SSA
PERSSURE INTEGRITY, THEREBY CAUSING LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-157
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 876
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST BEARING
LOSS OF LOWER PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT BRACKET
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY LOAD BEARING CAPABILITY WILL CAUSE SECONDARY
RESTRAINT TO SUSTAIN LOADS; HOWEVER, IF THE SECONDARY WERE ALSO
LOST, THE CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST WHEN SSA PRESSURE INTEGRITY
FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-158
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 877
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST BEARING
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT BRACKET, FRONT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, SCRE FRACTURE, DEFECTIVE
THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL LOAD BEARING CAPABILITY WILL CAUSE
SECONDARY RESTRAINT TO SUSTAIN LOADS. LOSS OF SECONDARY
RESTRAINT CONCURRENT WITH THE PRIMARY RESULTS IN GROSS LOSS OF
PRESSURE INTEGRITY AND CREWPERSON LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-159
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 878
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST BEARING
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT BRACKET REAR PIN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
B [ F ] C [ F ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, IMPACT/FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE PIN WILL CAUSE EFFECTIVE LOSS OF THE PRIMARY AXIAL
RESTRAINT AND RESULT IN THE SECONDARY RESTRAINT BEING REQUIRED TO
SUSTAIN SUIT LOADS. IF THE SECONDARY RESTRAINT BRACKET TO ALSO
FAIL, THE CREWPERSON WOULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-160
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 879
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST BEARING
LOSS OF REAR RESTRAINT BRACKET SCREW
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, IMPACT/FRACTURE, SCREW
STRIPPED/BACKS OUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PIN SET SCREW WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF PRIMARY RESTRAINT
BUT SECONDARY RESTRAINT STILL HELD BY BRACKET. HOWEVER, IF THE
BRACKET ITSELF LOST TWO SIDE SCREWS, BOTH RESTRAINT COULD BE LOST
AS COULD THE CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-161
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 880
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST BEARING
TETHER BRACKET FRACTURES/YIELDS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: i/I
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF THE TETHER BRACKET TO MAINTAIN THE CONNECTION OF THE
EVA CREWPERSON TO THE SHUTTLE CAN RESULT IN UNCONTROLLED
CREWPERSON SEPARATION AND LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-162
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 881
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LOSS OF HIP JOINT RING
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 0104-82335-22
CAUSES: IMPACT, DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF THE HIP JOINT RING WILL RESULT IN PARTIAL TO TOTAL
LOSS OF THE PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT FOR THE HIP AREA WITH LOAD
DEPENDENCE TRANSFERRED TO THE SECONDARY RESTRAINT. IF THE
SECONDARY RESTRAINT WERE ALSO LOST, SUIT LOADS COULD RESULT IN
GROSS
FAILURE OF SUIT PRESSURE INTEGRITY AND CREWPERSON LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-163
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 882
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT BLADDER ASSEMBLY
CROTCH BUCKLE YIELDS/FRACTURES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82335-22
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY LOAD RESTRAINT FOR CROTCH AREA TRANSFERS LOADS TO
SECONDARY RESTRAINT. IF SECONDARY RESTRAINT ALSO FAILS,
CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-164
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 883
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT BLADDER ASSEMBLY
WEBBING DETACHES FROM KEEPER RING
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82335-22
CAUSES: FABRIC TORN/WORN, THREAD BREAKS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE WEBBING DETACHES FROM THE KEEPER RING, MINOR DEFORMATION
OF THE LTA CAN RESULT. BECAUSE THE DEFORMATION WOULD BE MINOR,
MOBILITY SHOULD NOT BE SEVERELY RESTRICTED NOR SHOULD CREWPERSON
DISCOMFORT BE A FACTOR. NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-165
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 884
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST/BRIEF/LTA/BOOT TMG
SCISSOR POCKET LOOSE/TORN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: THREAD DEFECTIVE/TORN, MATERIAL DEFECT/WEAR/TEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO USE POCKET FOR RETENTION OF EVA SCISSORS SHOULD NOT
IMPACT MISSION OR CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-166
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 885
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DONNING AID HANDLES
FAIL ENGAGED TO LTA
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9857/9858
CAUSES: IMPACT, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MISSION AND THE CREWPERSON WILL NOT BE IMPACTED DUE TO THE
PRESENCE OF DONNING AID HANDLES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-167
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 886
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HELMET ASSEMBLY
FRESNEL LENS DETACHES
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) HELMET
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9672-01
c [ ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECTIVE, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIFFICULTY IN READING DCM DISPLAY AND CONTROLS. POSSIBLE
IRRITATION TO CREWPERSON DUE TO "FREE" LENS IN HELMET. MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-168
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 887
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
GIMBAL RING FRACTURES/YIELDS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: i/i
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-85894-11/12
CAUSES: IMPACT, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GIMBAL RING IS CRITICAL TO SUSTAINING GLOVE LOADS. IF LOST,
THE PRESSURE INTEGRITY OF THE GLOVE ASSEMBLY WILL ALSO BE LOST IN
AN UNCONTROLLABLE MANNER RESULTING IN LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-169
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 888
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
ZIPPER DETACHES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) LCVG
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-82968-07
CAUSES: FABRIC DEFECT/WEAR, MECHANICAL SEPARATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A DETACHED ZIPPER CAN RESULT IN POOR LCVG FIT AND THEREFORE
DEGRADED COOLING. MISSION TERMINATION WILL RESULT.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-170
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 889
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR ASSEMBLY
CRACKED/SCRATCHED PROTECTIVE VISOR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) HELMET
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUCED OR IMPAIRED VISION WILL RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-171
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 890
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR ASSEMBLY
EYE SHADES JAMMED/STUCK IN ONE POSITION
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) HELMET
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: IMPACT, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO EMPLOY EYESHADES DURING A MISSION WHICH REQUIRES
THEM CAN RESULT IN SIGNIFICANTLY IMPAIRED VISION AND MISSION
IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-172
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 891
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR ASSEMBLY
TENSION BAND BREAKS/YIELDS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE CAN HAVE ONE OF TWO CONSEQUENCES: I) A LOOSE EVVA NOT
HELD IN POSITION, OR 2) STICKS THE EVVA IN ONE POSITION. THE
LATTER CONSEQUENCE IS THE MOST CRITICAL IN THAT MISSION
TERMINATION CAN RESULT IF THE EVVA CANNOT BE EMPLOYED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-173

APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
Appendix F Legend
Code Definition
Blank The IOA and the NASA are in agreement.
1 The IOA recommends inclusion of this failure mode
into the NASA FMEA.
2 The IOA recommends inclusion of this fialure mode
into the NASA CIL.
3 The IOA recommends deletion of the failure mode
from the IOA analysis.
4 The IOA recommends incorporation of the identified
failure mode as a "cause" into a specific NASA FMEA.
5 The IOA recommends downgrading the NASA FMEA
criticality.
6 The IOA recommends upgrading the NASA FMEA
criticality.
7 The IOA recommends upgrading the NASA FMEA
criticality and adding the failure mode to the CIL.
8 The IOA recommends removal of the NASA failure
mode from the CIL.
9 The IOA agrees with the NASA analysis.
i0 The IOA recommends a change to a screen.
ii The IOA recommends the failure mode be removed
from the NASA FMEA. Analysis of this event is
more applicable to a hazard analysis.
12 The IOA recommends the NASA failure mode effects
to be modified.
13 The EVC should be covered by the communications
and tracking reports by the IOA.
F-I
APPENDIX :
NASA FMEA TO IDA WORKSHEETCROSS REFERENCE/ RECOMMENDATIONS
I IDENTIFIERS :I NASA I: IOA RECOMMENDATIONS , I
I.........................................._:..................II................................................I
: NASA : IDA _ CRIT _ SCREENS :: CBIT : SCREENS I OTHER : ISSUE
F_A NUMBER I ASSESSMENTNUMBER II HWiF I A B C II HW/F I A B C : IBEE LEGENDCODE) I
I EMU-145 _I /
I E_-175 I; i :
; EMU-177 I: / I
I EMU-195 II / l
I EMU-202 II 1 I
EMU-224 :: _ .:
; EMU-225 I_ /
I E_U-22_ :l /
: EMU-304 ]l i
I EHU-31? I_ t
; EBU-320 _1 /
I ENU-321 :: /
: EMU-342 :l t
I ERg-3_i I: /
: E_-384 I: i
: EMU-385 ;: /
EHU-38_ :: /
: EHU-3B7 :t /
: EMU-394 :; t
I EMU-395 I_ /
I E_-42B I: /
; E1_.1-439 :: t
: EMU-440 fl /
EMU-442 [: /
: E_U-460 I; /
: Elttl-461 _I I
: EMU-%3 _ /
; ERU-464 l_ /
: EHU-4b8 _: /
: EMU-47_ t_ t
EHU-47B :: t
; EMU-479 _: /
ERU-4BO l: /
EHU-485 :_ /
E_U-48_ 11 /
: EMU-487 :1 /
EMU-488 _ l
; EMU-4% :1 i
f EMU-509 I; I
EBU-510 :: /
; EMU-5II :1 /
: EMU-512 ;l /
: ENU-513 1: I
:l 2/1R ; P F P ; 1,2
II 3/3 I
:l 3/IR I P F P : 4
II 3/3 f I 1
:l 2/IR : P F P : 1,2
:: 212 I I 1,2
11 3/IR I P F P : 1,2
:: 311R : P F P ; 1,2
:I 2/IR _ P F P ; 4
:I 3/3 : I I
:[ 211R I P F P ; 1,2
l: ItI ; I 1,2
;: 3/3 ; : I
I; I : : 3
:: 3t2R ; P P P : I
II 2/2 I I 1,2
_ 312R I P F P I 1,2
,," 313 ,' I i
_I 2i2 I _ 1,2
:1 2/2 : : t,2
:I / I I 4
:: / l I 3
:I 3/IR t P F P : t,2
_I 31IR I P F P I 1,2
fl 1 I I 3
I!
,, / l I 3
:I 2/IR ] P F P _ 1,2
It 2/IR I P F P I 1,2
:: 2/IR I P F P : 1,2
;_ 313 ; I l
:: 3/2R I P NAP : I
312R : P NAP I I
211R I P F P I 1.2
2/;R I P P P ; 1,2
I 2/2 : ; 1,2
I 2/LR : P F P I 1,2
I 2/IR : P F P _ t,2
2/tR _ P F P : 1,2
I 3/3 : _ I
; / : : 13
I / ; : I3
; I ; : 13
; / : : 13
I X :
l :
l :
: X I
: X I
: X l
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I I
; X I
l :
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I X I
: X I
: X :
: X ;
: X :
: X ;
I :
: I
OR;,.,-.,,_ALPACE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
IDENTIFIERS II NASA II IOA RECOMMENDATIONS* i
..........................................iI ..............II ...............................................i
_ASA ; I_A II CRIT I SCREENS IICRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUEI
FMEANUMBER I ASSESSMENTNUMBERIIHW/F I A B C IIHW/F I A B C I (SEELEGENDCODE) I I
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::......======================================================
IO0-FMI
IOO-FM2
IO0-FM3
IO0-FM4
IOI-FMI
EMU-514
EHU-515
EMU-516
EMU-517
EHU-_O4
EMU-b12
EMU-61b
EMU-617
EMU-61B
ENU-675
EMU%76
E_J-b77
EMU-bT8
EMU%79
E_-_80
EMU-_BI
EMU-742X
EMU-BO3X
EMU-805X
EMU-813X
EMU-B20X
EMU-B25X
EMU-B26X
EMU-B29X
EMU-B34X
EMU-784X
EMU-7BSX
EMU-7B6X
EMU-TB7X
ENU-840X
EMU-B42X
EMU-B41X
EffU-B6_X
EMU-B6gX
EMU-BTOX
EMU-_01
EMU-611
EMU-B46X
EMU-B47X
EMU-848R
E_U-B49k
EMU-804X
EMU-605
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EMU-806X
EMU-600
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EMU-_IO
I01-FM2
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IOI-FM4
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I02-FMI
I02-FMIO
I02-FMII
I02-FM12
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102-FM!4
102-Ff115
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I02-FM17
i02-FM18
I02-FN!_
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I02-FM20
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Ii i
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II /
II i
I /
I /
I /
II /
II I
II /
II /
II i
II I
II I
I /
I I
I I
I !
II I
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II 2i2
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_I I/I
II 2/IR
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II I11
II 212
II 212
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I; Iii
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+I
I I
'II
.,L( .l.
II "_:'_
I I
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" 31:3I I
,," 312R
If 212
" 212I I
',I 212
" 212II
" 212It
" 212I I
,",211R
P P P II I
_' /It
P F P ',',I
P P P ,," I
P P P II i
P P P If 313
;_ I
II /
II
II I
,," 2/tR
I', /
I I i
II 212
I I /
P P P II i
P P P II /
If /
If 211R
II /
II I
",,211R
P P P II /
II
I I
P P P
P F P
P F F
P P F
P P F
P P F
13
13
13
13
1.2
3
3
3
7
7
7
7
7
1,2
I
I
1,2
}.,2
1,2
1.2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
6
F-3
O_i[I£_t_'iAL PAGE iS
QUAUTY
i IDENTIFIERS ',i NASA ,, lob RE.OMME.,D._ONo;
i..........................................I, ..............:'-,...............................................
.... o_,_'.EN_ , 01",4.:r i .....; NASA I IOA ',t CRII" I SCREENS I', _R.'_ i ........ .. IS=U_
" ........ 4UM=.RilHW/F ',A B C :,HW/F ; A B C ; ,==ELEGENDCODE."',rME_ NUMBER , A_oE=_MENI' "P .....
====================== --.=_ _ ¢=-- ---- .--- --_ --'-- ._= ¢ .................. _ ....... _ .......... J ..................... I ....... t
I ......................................................... : b I .......
EMU-&07
EMU-610A
EMU-60B
EMU-O0?
=MU-SJIA
EMU-a02
EMU-8011
EMU-BO2X
EMU-603
EMU-B43X
EMU-B44X
EMU-B_GX
EMU-629
EMU-632
EMU-BIGX
EMU-B65X
EMU-628A
EMU-627A
EMU-B66X
EMU-817X
EMU-B!BX
EMU-635
EMU-B71X
EMU-6_4
EMU-633
EMU-636
EMU-B52X
EMU-B72X
EMU-BI5X
EMU-630
EMU-627
EMU-62B
EMU-B14X
EMU-a31
EMU-658
EMU-B24X
EMU-647
EMU-S74X
EMU-64B
EMU-S75X
EMU-876X
EMU-B77X
EMU-BTSX
EMU-B79X
EMU-BBOX
EMU-B73X
EMU-B27X
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102-FM23
!02-FM24
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I:}2-_M27
!02-F_2_
I02-FM4
,02-FM_
I02-FM6
Iv_-FM..
I02-FM8
I02-FM?
!03-FMI
10_-FM10
103-FM11
I03-FM]2
I03-FMI3.FMI4
10_-FM!5
I03-FMI6
!03-FM17
!03-FMIB
I0_-FM19
103-FM2
103-FM20
I03-FM21
I03-FM22
103-FM23
I03-FM3
I03-FM_
I03-FM5
Iuo-rno.FM8
!O_-FM7
lO_-rM9
104-FMI
i04-FMIO
!04-F_!I
IO_-FM]2
!04-F_13
104-F_H4
!04-F_!5
;04-FMI6
I04-FM17
I04-FMIB
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I04-FM20
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_04-FM_
I04-FM24
i04-FM25
I04-FM26
I04-FM2B
I04-FM29
I04-FM3
I04-FM30
I04-FN31
]04-FM32
IO_-FM33
I04-FM34
I04-FM35
tO4-FM36
I04-FM37
tO4-FM3B
I04-FM39
tO4-FM4
I04-FM40
tO4-FM41
I04-FM5
I04-FM6
I04-FM7
EMU-82B× II 2/IR
EMU-651 _I 2/IR
EMU-65IA ,,"2/IR
ENU-881X II 2/IR
EMU-BB_x
EMU-BB3X II 3i3
EMU-652 II III
EMU-657 II 312R
EMU-B30X II 211R
EMU-B67X II 2/IR
EMU-654 ",, 211R
EMU-654A II 2ilR
E_U-653 II III
EMU-B33X _I 2/IR
EMU-B31X II 312R
EMU-B32X ,," 313
EMU-655 II 313
EMU-B35X _I 313
EMU-656 II 212
EMU-B56X II 313
EMU-BB4X II 3/3
EMU-659 II 311R
EMU-B85X II 3/3
EMU-B54X II 313
EMU-B55X II 313
EMU-B53X II 3i3
EMU-6% II Ilt
EMU-622 II III
EMU-BOgX II 21_R
E_O-BOTX II 212
J_EMU-GB6X II _ _
EIItI-BOBX II 212
EMU-620 ,,"3ilR
EMU-62I II 212
E_U-6_7 ,, 312R
EMU-642 II Ill
E_U-B22X II 21IR
EMU-B23X ii 3/2R
EMU-643 II 212
EMU-645 II 212
EMU-644 II _I_
EMU-B59X II 313
EMU-B5BX II 212
EMU-860X II 313
EMU-B64X II 2/2
EMU-640A II Iil
E_U-B57X II 313
EMU-640 II 2/IR
EMU-BB7X II llI
EMU-639 II 313
II
I04-FMB
lOq-FM9
I05-FNI
}05-FM2
105-F_3
I05-FM4
I05-FM5
I05-FM6
I05-FM7
I06-FMI
I06-FMIO
I06-FMtl
I06-FMI2
tO6-FMI3
I06-FMI4
]06-FMt5
IO_-FMIb
I06-FN17
IO6-FMIB
I06-FM19
I06-FM2
I06-F_20
I06-FR3
]Ob-FH4
I06-FM5
P NAP II I
P NAP I: /
P NAP II i
P NAP II i
P NAP I', /
II I
II 211R
P P P If 212
P NAP II /
P NAP II ,'
P NAP II /
P NAP ',I I
I', 2/IR
P F P II I
P F P II /
II 2/2
II I
II /
II I
If 212
II /
P F P II i
II I
II /
II I
II i
II 2iIR
II i
P F P II I
II i
II I
II i
P NAP II 1
II 2/IR
P F P LI !
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P F P II /
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_',
I',
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F
F
F
P
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P P F
I0
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9
0
5
7
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I06-FMb
I06-FM7
105-FMB
I06-FM9
I07-FMI
I07-FM10
I07-FMII
I07-FM12
I07-FM13
I07-FHI4
107-FM15
I07-FM16
I07-FH17
I07-FM2
I07-FM3
I07-FH4
I07-FM5
I07-FM6
I07-FM7
I07-FMB
I07-FM9
IO8-FMI
IOB-FMIO
IOB-FM2
IOB-FM3
IOB-FM4
IOB-FM5
IOB-FM6
IOB-FM7
IOB-FM8
EMU-BI?X
EMU-63B
EMU%41
EMU-B21X
E_U-BBBX
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EMU-B3BX
EMU-665
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EMU-BIOX
EMU-B63X
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EMU-625
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EMU-BIIX
EMU-BIIX
EMU-626
EMU-623
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EHU-BglX
EMU-669
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EMU-674
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EMU-252
EMU-250
EMU-251
EMU-253
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IIO-FM4
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113A-FM3
113A-FM4
II3B-;M2
113B-FM3
II3C-FMi
II_C-FM2
113C-FM3
i13D-FM1
I13_-FM2
113D-FM3
EMU-222
EMU-223
EMU-230
EMU-231
EMU-229
EMU-234
EMU-233
EMU-232
EMU-236
EMU-237
EMU-238
EMU-239
EMU-235
EMU-240
EffU-712X
EMU-242
E_U-243
EMU-245
EMU-244
EMU-241
EMU-713X
EMU-20g
EMU-210
EMU-212
EMU-211
EMU-752X
EffU-259
EMU-268
EMU-270
EflU-269
EMU-257
EMU-25B
EMU-25BA
EMU-255
EMU-714X
EMU-256
EMU-715X
EMU-260
EMU-753X
EMU-754X
EMU-261
EMU-262
EMU-2B5
EMU-266
EMU-253
EMU-264
EMU-267
EMU-27!
EMU-272
EMU-275
II3D-FM4
II3D-FMS,FM6
I13D-FM7
113E-FMI
I13E-FM2
II3E-FM3
113E-FM4
I13E-FM5
Ii3E-FM6
114-FMI,FM2
II4-FM3,FM4
II4-FM5
I14-FM6
114-FM7
IIS-FMI
II5-FMIO
II5-FMII
IL5-FMI2
IIS-FMI3
IIS-FMI4
II5-FMI5
IIS-FMI6
I15-FM17
115-FM18
115-FM19
115-FM2
IIS-FM20
II5-FM2L
IIS-FM)
115-FM4
IIS-FM5
115-FM6
I15-FM7
ILS-FM8
115-FM9
II6-FMI
116-FM2
120A-FMI
2/2
2/IR
211R
2/IR
2/IR
2/2
2/IR
2/IR
211R
211R
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3/3
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2i2
3/3
2/IR
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2/2
2/IR
3/3
31IR
2/2
2/IR
2/1R
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I_ 2/2
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" 2/2II
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II 2/1R
_I 2/2
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:I iltR
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11 211R
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" 2/2
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_ 2/2
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P P P i
/
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/
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I
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/
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P P P /
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/
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P F P 1
/
P P P i
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120A-FM2
120A-FH3
:20B-FMI
120B-FM2.FM3
12UB-FM5
I20C-FM!
120C-FN2
120C-FM3
121-FMI
121-FM2
I_IFM.
121-FM;
121-FM5
122-FMI
122-FM2
122-FM3
122-FM4
122-FM5
123-FMI
123-FMI0
123-FMII
123-FM12
123-FM2
123-FM3
123-FM4
123-FM5
123-FM6
123-FM7
123-FMB
123-FM9
125-FMI
125-FM2
125-FM3
125-FM;
126-FMI
12_-FM2
127-FMI
127-FM2
127-FM3
128-FMI
128-FMI
128-FM3
131i162-FM1
131/162-FM2
EMU-27_
EMU-273
EMU-27b
EMU-277
EMU-27£
EMU-27B
EMU-282
EMU-2BI
EMU-280
ENU-20[
EMU-199
EMU-198
EMU-2OO
EMU-197
EMU-204
EMU-205
EMU-716X
EMU-206
EMU-203
EMU-I85
EMU-[B7
EMU-1BB
EMU-190
EMU-751X
EMU-717X
EMU-IB4
EMU-17B
EMU-IB2
EMU-179
EMU-IBI
EMU-IB3
EMU-IB9
EMU-I@O
EMU-IB6
EMU-147
EMU-t48
EMU-14g
EMU-150
EMU-[51
EMU-20B
E_U-207
EHU-IS?
EMU-156
EMU-155
EMU-153
EMU-154
EMU-t52
EMU-IO0
EMU-I03
EMU-I02
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2/IR
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1/I
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2/IR
I', 2/2
',I 2ilR
',I 211R
I I
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II 2/2
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PPPI:!
PPPII!
2tIR
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2/IR
P NAP /
PPP /
P P P /
2/IR
21tR
PFP /
PPP /
2/IR
2/IR
PPP /
/
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PPP /
21tR
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PPP i
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131/I_2-FM2 I EMU-I05
131/Ib2-FM3 I EMU-IOI
: EMU-I04
131./Ib2-FM_ _ EMU-719X
131_i62-FN5 i EHU-?iBX
I31/I_2-FHo i EMU-72OX
132A-FHI : EMU-2B4
132A-FN2,FM3 I EMU-285
132A-FM4 I EMU-2B6
132A-F_5 I EMU-2B3
I_2B-FMI I EMU-IOg
132B-FM2,FM3 _ EMU-|IO
132B-FM4 _ EMU-112
132B-FM5 _ EMU-III
134-FMI : EMU-I&3
134-FM2 I EMU-_64
; EMU-I_5
13_-F_3 IEMU-162
135-FMI _ EMU-;2_
135-FM2 I E_-125
135-F_3 ; EMU-124
13a-FM_ I EMU-121
_36-FM2 i EMU-il9
136-FM3 I EMU-120
}3_,-FM4 I EMU-I22
137-FMI _ EMU-I2B
137-FM2 I EMU-129
137-FM3 _ EMU-131
137-FM4 I E_U-_26
137-FM5 I EMU-127
137-FM6 I EMU-130
13B-FMI : EMU-132
138-FM2 I EMU-|33
138-FM3 ; EMU-135
13B-FM4 I EMU-I_4
139-FMI,FM4 ; EMU-144
:39-FM2,FM3 I EMU-14_
139-FM5 _ E_U-143
cMU-_,IX140-FMI _ _ _
140-FMIO I EMU-756X
!4_-FM2 I EMU-I_7
140-F_3 ; E_U-7_SX
I_O-FM4 i E_U-142
140-FM5 _ EMU-140
140-FM6 I EMU-!39
140--FM7 _ EMU-13B
140-FMB I EMU-13_
140-FM9 _ E_U-14|
141-FMI,FN3 i EMU-159
141-FM2 _ EMU-160
:l 211R
',I 211_
',', 2/IR
%1 3ilR
II 2/IR
:: 2/1_
',; 2/2
_I 2/2
II 2/IR
I; 2/IR
',I 2/2
" 2i2
2/IR
2,IR
3/I.R
2/IR
211R
2/tR
2/IR
312R
3/IR
3/3
2/IR
211R
2/IR
2/IR
2/2
2/2
212
2ILR
2/2
2/2
2/2
2]LR
2/IR
3/3
2;IR
2/IR
2ilR
2/iR
2/IR
211R
2/IR
2/_.R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/2
m, ,')
P P P II /
ppp ;,, /
PPP I', i
P F P I; I
P F F' ',I 3/',R
p P P ',',/
I', 3/2R
',',I
PF P _', i
P PP I', /
II 3/2R
',I /
P F P II /
P P P II /
P NAP /
P P P /
P P P t
P P P /
P F P /
P NAP I
P F P /
2/IR
P P P l
P P P /
P P P l
P P P /
/
/
:I
P P P /
211R
/
I
P F P I
P P P /
/
/
p p p " /
P P P i
P F' P /F
P P P /
P P P /
P P P i
P P P /
P F' P /
P P P /
F P P /
P P P /
2/IR
2ilR
P P P
P F P
NA
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
9,I0
tO
10
9,12
_,10
7
10
IC
I0
9
9
g
9
F-9
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14!-FM4
142-F_2
i45-FMI
143-FM2
143-FM3
]45-FMI
145-FM2
i45-FM3
146-FMI
I%-FM2
146-FM3
146-FM4
147-FMI
]47-FM2
147-FM_
_49-FMI
I_8-FM2
14B-FM3
148-FN4
150-FMI
150-FMI0
150-FM11
150-FM12
150-FMI_
150-FM14
150-FM2
150-FM3
150-FM4
150-FM5
150-FM6
150-FM7
150-FMB
150-FM?
_oi-F_1
170-FMI
171-FMI
EM_-[5B
EMU-113
EMU-114
E_U-I!5
E_U-11o
EMU-117
EMU-IIB
EMU-213
EMU-214
EMU-215
EMU-217
EMU-216
EMU-21B
EMU-723X
EMU-219
ENU-,_O
EMU-221
EMU-I06
EMU-[OB
EMU-I07
EMU-724X
EMU-TC4X
EMU-466
E_U-%7
EMU-71IX
EMU-757X
EMU-lSBX
EMU-7OSX
EMU-465
EMU-706X
EMU-707X
EMU-7OSX
EMU-7Ogx
EMU-462
EMU-710X
EMU-726X
EMU-I;I
EMU-169
EMU-171
EMU-IaB
EMUmI76
EMU-I_7
EMU-172
EMU-174
EMU-176
EMU-173
EMU-727X
EMU-?2BX
EMU-322
171-FM_.
171-FM5
171-FMo
172-FMI
172-FM2
172_-FM..-:
174-FMI
174-FM2
200-FMI
2/iR
2;IR
3/IR
2_1,__
3/IR
2/IR
2/LR
2/IR
2,'2
312R
211R
2/IR
2/IR
3i3
2/IR
2/2
._/2R
2/2
2/1R
2/IR
2iIR
2/2
_i2R
3i!R
2/IR
2/IR
211R
2/2
.')
2/2
212
21IR
212
2/2
2,'2
3/3
", 2/IR
',3i!R
', 3iLR
', _,2R
II 212
I', 21LR
II 2t2
II _12B'.
,", .3ilR
i
, I 2/IR
II 3/3
" 212i i
II ll/l
II
PPP ;
P P P
P '_P iiiM ,
n NAF' 2!lR
PPP ;
P F F 311R
P NAP /
ppp ,'
P P P i
i
F' N_ P _' _
P P P i
P P P /
F NAP 1
I
PPP /
2/IR
P NAP
21LR
PFPIll
PPPIII
P F P II i
II /
P F P il 2/2
P F P I: 2/2
P F P II ,'
PFPII/
PPPII/
II /
_I I
PFPIIi
_I /
,,"211R
Ii 111
PPPll/
PFPIii
PFPIII
P F P II /
,I [_;
P P II I
II 3/IR
PFP_Ii
PFP::i
PPP:Ii
'_,2/IR
II 211R
II
P
P P P
P P P
P
P P P
F P P'
P P P
P F P
P P P
2,10
2,c,lO
I0
6
9
I0,12
?
6
q
10
,(
X i
I
I
){ I
X I
I
F-IO
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200-FM2
210-F_I
2:;B-FMI
213B-FM3
_IoB-FM4
I,,B-FM5
213D-FMI
213D-FMIO
213D-FM2.FM3.FM4
213D-FM5
213D-FM6
213D-FM7
213D-FMB
213D-FH9
213E-FMI
213E-FM2
213E-FM4
213F-FMI
_I_,-FM_.FM7
_I_-FM2
£1d-rl]_
215-FM4
215-FH5
:Ij-rM6
300-FMI
300-FM2
300-FM3
300-FM_
300-FM5
300-FM6
300-FM7
311-FMI,FM3
311-FM2
311-FM4
EMU-_%A
EMU-295
EMU-296
EMU-30?
EMU-S05
E_U-306
EMU-303
EMU-302
EMU-729X
EMU-309
EMU-.,I.:
EMU-310
EMU-311
EMU-312
EMU-30B
EMU-730X
r" "r "I
EIIU-.3!7
EMU-31o
EMU-314
EMU-.:.I_
EMU-3IB
EMU-301
EMU-300
EMU-2_.7
EMU-29B
EMU-29BA
EMU-299
EMU-50B
EMU-505
EMU-760X
EMU-507
EMU-504
EMU-506
EMU-503
EMU-759X
EMU-363
EMU-362
EMU-359
EMU-365
EMU-_66
EMU-3_8
EMU-367
EMU-3_4
EMU-501
EMU-502
EMU-500
EMU-3bgA
EMU-375
EMU-376
31¢-FM2
_I_-FM_,
:'21-FMI,FM2
321-FM3
J21-FM4
330-FMI
330-FMIO
330-FMII
I I/I
I l/I
I I/I
I) III
) I/I
I I/1
I 2/IR
il L/l
II 3/3
)I i/I
II 2/2
I) I/I
)) !/I
)) I/I
II I/I
I) 3/3
I: 2/2
iI 3/2R
d_ _R
i/I
I/I
I/l
2/IR
2/IR
I/I
211R
211R
3/3
3/3
31IR
2/2
3/3
9_
2/2
312R
3/2R
3/2R
2/IR
3/IR
_/i_
3ilR
211R
2iIR
212
212
211R
2/2
_9
212
Ii
II
I)
)I
P F P II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
P P P II
P P P II
I'.
II
P P P I',2/2
P F P II I
II i
II /
P F' P II _/I
P F P II i
II /
If /
P NAP II /
II 313
II /
II I
',I. 313
t Jt £RF F P ", "_'
P P P II
P P P II
PPP I',
P .."'F' 11
P NAP II
F' NAP I;
p p p ',',
P P P II
',I
II
P PP '.I
:_ 31IR
',I /
_ 2/2
P F
P NAP
9
2,tO
5
?
9
2,5
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330-FM12
d.J,..,-rM_.J
_30-FM14
330-F_Ib
3_O-FMI7
33C,-FMIB
330-FM19
330-FM2
330-FN3
330-FM4
330-FM5
330-FM6
330-FM7
330-FM8
330-FM9
350-FMI
350-FMI0
350-FM11
350-FM12
350-FM13
350-FM14
350-FM15
350-FM16
350-FM17
350-FM18
350-FM19
350-FM20
350-FM21
350-FM22
350-FM24
350-Fff25
350-FM2_
35_-FM27
350-F_27
35_-FM3
EMU-377
EMU-3G3
EMU-3B2
EMU-378
EMU-379
EMU-731X
EMU-732X
EMU-372
EMU-369
EMU-373
EMU-371
EMU-371A
EMU-370
ENU-370A
EMU-381
EMU-3BO
EMU-374
EMU-484
EMU-76_X
EMU-7_7X
EMU-768X
EMU-7b?X
EMU-472
EMU-471
EMU-469
EMU-470
EMU-498
EMU-499
EMU-492
EMU-493
EMU-490
EMU-494
EMU-495
EMU-497
EMU-481
E_-770X
EMU-771X
EMU-772X
EMU-i_^
EMU-774X
EMU-775X
EMU-475
EMU-477
EMU-489
EMU-776X
EMU-4B2
EMU-777X
EMU-491
EMU-778X
EMU-779X
350-FM30
350-FM3I
350-FM32
350-FM33
350-F_34
350-FM35
2/2
3;3
2/2
2"2
2/2
2/2
2/2
3/IR
2/2
2/IR
2/2
211R
212
3/2R
312R
2/IR
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
212
3/tR
2/2
21tR
2/2
2/2
313
21tR
211R
211R
2/IR
2i2
31iR
2ilR
3/'R
211R
,3,'3
3/3
,, 2/IR
I: 211R
,," 2/IR
II 3,".3
I I "J / .f.i_
I I 3iIR
',_ 2/IR
If 3/1R
",, 2/IR
,,I
P NAP
PPP
FPP
PPP
PPP
PFP
PPP
P F P
P F P
2/IR
ItR
311R
P P P
P
P P P
P P P
P F P II
P F P II
P F P ',l
P F P tl
II
P NAP ',',
P F P :_
I_ NAP II
F F P I',
F P P ',_
PP P :',
P P P I;
,,,,
PF P I',
P NAP ',l /
P F P II /
P F P II 21IR
P F P II I
F
F
9
10
g
9
9
9
9
2,10
2,10
11
2,10
9
6
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_50-FM4
•350-Fii7
_.:_,;::-Fif8
350-Fff','
Z',5I-FMI
35_-FM2
351-FM3
351-FM4
351-FM5
351-FMo
_bO-FMI,FM_
360-FM2
3aO-FM3,FMB
3bO-FM4,FM9
.,60-rM.,,FMIO
3bO-FM7
361-FM1
361-FM2
3_I-FM3
3bI-FM4
361-FM5
3b2-FM_
362-FM3
_,b_-rM4
3b2-FM5
362-FMb
362-FM7
c,6¢-FM8
_,_-FM9
EMU-_8_
EtIU-761X
EMU-762X
E_U-763X
Et!U-7_4X
EMU-765k
EMU-458
EMU-457
EMU-459
EMU-780X
EMU-TBIX
E_U-782X
EMU-392
EMU-393
EMU-733X
EMU-734X
EMU-391
EMU-393A
EMU-_%
EMU-3?8
EMU-,_uX
EMU-397
EMU-399
EMU-736K
EMU-4]O
EMU-400
EMU-401
EMU-411
EMU-402
EMU-4#3
EMU-412
EMU-404
EMU-405
EMU-40_
EMU-407
EMU-413
EMU-40B
EMU-409
E_U-_23
EMU-419
E_U-417A
EHU-41_A
EMU-415
EMU-414
EMU-416
EMU-414A
EMU-415A
EMU-42_
E_U-425
EMU-424
3b4-FMI
364-FMI0
3b4-FMl_
$64-FMi2
364-FM13
_M-FMI4
_o4-FMI5
3M-FMI_
364-FM17
3b4-FMI8
3o4-FM19
364-FM2
3/IR
3/3
3/3
3i2R
311R
211R
21IR
3,3
313
312R
312R
312R
3i2R
312R
212
313
313
" 313I I
;I 313
" 313i l
" 312R
',',312R
,,"3/2R
',,' 3i2R
',i312R
,,"3/2R
II 312R
'I 3,2R
I 312R
] 312R
', 312R
', 312R
', 3i2R
', 2!2
' 2/1,_:
2,_2
2_XR
.f.$x.
2,'2
")I_,
_./&.
;', 211R
II 2/IR
'_, 212
I I 212
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
II
P P P II
P P P _
P P P II
P P P I;
P P P II
P F P
P F P
P P NA
P F P
P F P
P P NA
P F P
P F P
P NAP
P NAP
P F NA
P F P
P F P
P P P
P P F
P F P
P P P
I
i' F
i
!
/
/
2/2
II 312R
II 2i2
II 212
li 212
[I /
I I ml_
I; 2/2
;I I
i
I
3/3
I
/
3/3
I
I
I
!
3/3
I
/
i
I
i
/
I
/
2i2
I
I
i
P P P
9 i
2,Ii} I
I
5,8
2,6
2,6
2.6
9
2,6
2,6
9
?
9
5.8
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36_-FMS
364-FHB
364-FM_
365-FMI
oo_-FM_
365-FR3
365-FM4
3o5-FM5
365-FM_
3&5-FM7
365-FMB
365-FM9
3ab-FM1
,oo-FM_
366-FM3
36b-FM4
_6a-FH5
366-FM6
367-FMI
367-FN2
' 367-FM3
367-FM_
367-FM5
367-FM6
36B-FM1
368-FM2
368-FM3
36B-FM4
3bB-FM5
36B-FM6
_SB-FM7
_68-FM8
3BS-FMI
_oS-F_
E_U-421
EMU-420
EMU-_
E_U-420A
EMU-421A
EMU-41B
EMU-417
EMU-427
EMU-435
EMU-436
EMU-4_2
EMU-433
EMU-434
E_U-429
EMU-430A
EMU-430
E_U-431
EMU-444
EMU-437
EMU-4_3
EMU-441
EMU-43@
EMU-TOIX
ENU-702X
EMU-445
EMU-450
E_U-449
EMU-446
EMU-447
EMU-44B
EMU-451
EMU-453
EMU-_,
EMU-45q
EMU-737X
EMU-455
EMU-456
EMU-703X
EMU-739X
E_U-388
EMU-3B9
EMU-390
EMU-73BX
E_U-474
EMU-473
EMU-323
EMU-_io,
EMU-_25
E_U-325A
EMUo324
.385-FM4
.,B,,-FM_,
410-FMI
410-FM2
410-FM3
4tO-FM4
+IO-FM5
m+m
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
_/2R
312R
3/2R
3;2R
3/2R
2/2
3/2R
3;3
312R
2/2
3/3
2/IF_
2/tR
2/2
2!IR
3/IR
3/tR
2/2
2!2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/JR
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
3;.3
2/IR
2/IR
_' 2,'R
3/3
2/2
3/3
", "I
.3!3
', 3;'3
', 2t2
', 3i3
i
i
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P F
P P P
P F P
P P P
P P P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P P P
P P ?
F' P P
/
!'
/
/
/
/
/ P
/ F
I
/
/
I
/
3/2R P P P
/
3/2R P P P
i
/
i
2/IR F P F P
/
/
!
/
/
it
/
2!IR P P P
/
/
2/IR P F P
/
/
I
/
/
/
/
/
/
2/2
_I 2/2
t_ 2/2
:t /
II 2/2
t_
6
9
5.8
9
2.6
9
2,6
2,6
9
2,&
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4D-FM6. FM7 EMU-324#, 212 ', ; / o
41S-FmP
41C-FM9
4II-D!!
_".26-F_[
_t23&C-F'_i
41.-F_11
418-FMI
418-FM2
41B-FM3
4t8-FM4
419-FMI
419-FM2
_19-FM3
420-FMI
_120-F!12
42_-FMI.FM2
423-FM3
423-FM4
_!24-F_I
424-FM2
_25-FMI
425-FM2
425-FM3
_25-FM4
425-FM5
4254:%
425-FM7
425-FMB
425-FM9
440-=FM5
_,70-FMI
470-FM2
470-FME.
_80-FM!
a80-FE2
480-FM_
4304115.FM6
480-FM7
4BO-FM8
4_0-F,%
E_U-_;2'--
EMU-:27
E,%-J;S
EMU-340
EMU-343
EMU-_45
EMU-_44
EMU-346
EMU-342
EMU-_I
EMU-349
EMU-350
EMU-34B
EMU-357
EMU-356
EMU-353
EMU-352
EMU-351
EMU-354
EMU-35_
EMU-332
E_U-_3
EMU-328
EMU-:_2?
EMU-334
EMU-_35
EMU-330
EMU-_31
E_U-7_gX
EMU-750X
EMU-783X
E_U-743X
EMU-744X
EMU-745X
EMU-7_6._
EMU-193
EMU-194
EM_-[%
E_U-747
EMU-7-'.SX
EMU-192
EMU-I?2A
E_U-290
EMU-292
EMU-289
EMU-2B@
2.2 _,
2/2 i
2/2 '_
_I 2/2
_,i2/2
;', 2/2
I',2/2
;', 2/2
',i 2/2
;', 2/2
',', 2/2
I',312R
',', 2i2
',', 2,;2
',I 2,:2
2/2
21LR
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
3/2R
312R
2/2
2/2
2!2
2,'2
2i2
I', 2/2
',I 2/2
',I 2/2
',i 2/1R
H 2/2
',', 2/2
',{ 2/2
'.', 2/IR
" 2/_R
2..,'.R
2;_.R
2;IS
2/1R
2/1R
1/I
2/IR
3/!R
._/IR
I /
i:
11 ;
II I
II /
II I
F P P II 2/2
;i I
I; /
II /
I', x
FPPI', I
'I J
[ /
ppp', I
p p p _,', ,,
, ,,
_I /
',', /
II /
I', /
PPPI', /
I', /
tl /
FPP',_ ,'
FPP',',/
P P F' /
p p _' /
P P P /
P P F /
2/IR
P P P /
P P P /
F NAP 211R
F F P ,'
?
P F F
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